THE

MODERN CHURCHMAN

By identifying the new learning with heresy, you make orthodoxy synonymous with ignorance.—*Erasmus.*

A State without the means of change is without the means of its conservation.—*Edmund Burke.*

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SIGNS OF THE TIMES

Mr. A. C. Benson's Indictment.

Mr. A. C. Benson, in the following paragraph from a recent letter to the *Times* (February 27th), prefers a serious indictment against the Church Assembly:

May one who is seriously concerned about the influence and the future of the Church of England make a serious plea against the policy now being pursued by the Church Assemblies?

It matters little what has brought the change about, but it is common knowledge that in the last few years the Church has undoubtedly been losing her hold upon the nation. The old obligation of church-going has declined; it is no longer considered a duty, but has become a mere matter of private concern. It is difficult to get clergymen; it is not easy to raise money for Church purposes; ecclesiastical pronouncements are disregarded and possess little authority among either the intelligent or the unintelligent.

But what are the Church Assemblies doing? Month after month they are engaged, with enthusiasm and even animus, in discussions which would seem to be more suited to be the private proceedings of the Society of Antiquaries. The Church has become the tilting-ground of specialists. I am not here for a moment disputing the interest of the questions debated, from an antiquarian point of view, or the dignity of the ceremonial aimed at, from an æsthetic point of view. But I do not believe that such antiquarian or æsthetic considerations make the smallest general appeal to the 'laity,' as they are somewhat slightingly called; though there is, of course, a section in the Church, more clerical than lay, to whom these matters are of deep interest and concern, a section whose policy, there is good reason to believe, is more exclusive than inclusive.

But the danger of the present situation is that by keeping such questions as these in the forefront of their proceedings, and by speaking and writing as if they were of profound and far-reaching urgency,

> the Assemblies of the Church of England are running the risk of seeming to persuade a large number of moderate men and women to suppose that the principles of Christianity and even morality are bound up with these minutiæ, or at all events that these minutiæ are of primary importance.

The indictment has much to support it, notwithstanding Mr. A. T. Lawrence's able reply next day. The Church—or the clergy, to be more explicit—are, we fear, losing their grip of the nation. It is vain to point out that they still have access to its pockets. When we consider the national wealth the sums obtained are trivial. That they are somewhat larger than they were several years ago is due to the better organization of the methods by which money is raised, and to the heroic loyalty of the great majority of the clergy, whose efforts in this direction are viewed with indifference, if not with tacit disapprobation by not a few of the laity. There is, although Mr. Benson does not mention it, a growing feeling among the laity that the Church Assembly is being used too much for devising schemes for improving the financial position of the clergy at the expense of the laity, yet without making any adequate cession of authority to the parochial laity such as they believe was promised them at the inauguration of the new *régime*. Not the clergy but the laity should discuss and control Church finance. The laity are markedly generous if they secure the clergy and the ministrations they desire—but in order to be sure of getting these the laity must be given a much larger measure of authority than they have at present, especially in the direction of vetoes.

With regard to the recent debates on Prayer Book revision to which Mr. Benson takes serious exception, we admit that the effect of some of them has been deplorable. Yet if Prayer Book revision was to be attempted by such methods, such debates were inevitable. It is the publication of them in the Press which is the mistake. It seems to us that the House of Clergy ought to have gone into committee and the Press have been excluded. Yet the publication of these debates has not been without its advantages. The debates have opened the eyes of the laity to the great influence and resolution of the Romanizing section among the clergy. At the same time, the debates have also given the impression that the Church is more concerned with the tithing of mint and anise and cummin than

with judgement, mercy, and faith. Yet this second impression, as Mr. Benson points out, does the clergy as a whole grave injustice:

> I am sure that the misunderstanding is increasing daily in the minds of many moderate religious-minded people. Of course it *is* a misunderstanding. The Church is doing an immense amount of excellent work, but it is of a quiet kind and does not advertise itself. The worst of it is that what is advertised is the active interest in elaborate details of liturgical worship, which certainly cannot be included among the weightier matters of the law, and which lie outside of what is or ought to be the Church's main concern—its moral mission.

But besides moral and social problems, Mr. Benson would have the Church Assembly tackle theological problems. He writes:

> One would have thought that the chief energies of the Church would have been thrown into religious and social problems, how to disentangle the old faith from its temporary accretions, how to bring religion into line with the scientific spirit, how to emphasize the growing social conscience, how to meet and interpret the claims of temperament and individuality, how to minimize the perilous clash of social forces, and, above all, how to unite divergent influences on the basis of a simple Christian faith.

It is quite true that 'the old and sharply-defined dogmas,' 'the crudely miraculous claims of medieval theology,' 'have lost their hold upon the increasing intelligence of the nation.' It is consequently true that they are helping to discredit the Church with the nation. It is also obviously true that the English Church stands in need of a theological reformation—the most difficult and dangerous of all reformations to attempt and achieve in a religious communion. But, having admitted that, let us add we are convinced that the House of Clergy is not in a position to achieve it. We need a much better educated clergy before the House of Clergy can profitably undertake this most needful work. We are convinced that the clergy must lead in this matter—all the great reformers in the Christian Church have been priests—and there must also be a large and enthusiastic body of lay supporters. When we survey the present situation do we find this? Nothing of the kind. We find some hundreds of liberal or modernist clergy engaged in parochial work, but possessed of very little either in the way of leisure or resources for active modernist propaganda; we see also a small body of cathedral clergy—probably about a tenth

of the whole cathedral clergy of England—engaged in promoting the new learning; we see also a small body of academic clergy, definitely and energetically modernist, of whom perhaps about a third hold official positions in the colleges of Oxford and Cambridge. We see in the Churchmen's Union a body—an increasing body—of modernist laity. But what we mainly see is a vast body of indifferent or disgruntled laity who with efficient propaganda might be made whole-heartedly and enthusiastically modernist. We also see a large body of potential ordinands who might be trained, if there were the liberal theological colleges in which to train them, to teach with deep and wide-reaching effect a modern Christian theology which within a few years would lead to a theological reformation of the English Church.

But, on the other hand, we also see within the English Church a remarkable policy of organization which is steadily securing the reins of power, controlling the finances, moulding institutions, founding associations, pouring forth publications, influencing the press, advertising everywhere, and all with the purpose of realizing a Church ideal which is reactionary, obscurantist, exclusive, and despised or detested by the average Englishman; yet we see also that such splendid energy, self-sacrifice, and organization is, as it deserves, securing its reward. We will cite but one example of this activity. £4,000 was given from the Fiery Cross Fund last year to Anglo-Catholic theological colleges to train thirty-five candidates for Holy Orders. This contribution, let it be noted, was from one fund only. We wonder what amount was given by liberals during the same period to assist in the training of liberal ordinands?

Now, able public protests uttered at intervals in the *Times* or elsewhere are not sufficient to alter or save the situation. That is where liberal Churchmen deceive themselves. Organization can only be met by organization, propaganda by propaganda, self-sacrifice and untiring endeavour by self-sacrifice and untiring endeavour. If Christian faith, be it of the old type or the new, cannot produce these things it must fail to win mankind. *Palma non sine pulvere.* The English Church can be saved, and saved to be what Mr. Benson desires it to be;

but this can only be by strenuous and self-sacrificing organization, and organization Mr. Benson and most laymen of his type appear to ignore or despise. Yet we must have organization, not for purposes of agitation, but for purposes of education. We must have an educated Church, and that means an educated clergy. These will be able to carry out the needful theological reforms at comparatively little cost: it is the preliminary education which costs—and, to use Sir Walter Raleigh's abverb costs *terribly*.

Dr. Neville Talbot returns to the Charge.

The Bishop of Pretoria's second article, published in the *Church Times* of February 27th, is as deserving of serious regard as was his first, to which we directed attention in our December Number (1924). Dr. Talbot's theme is the Romeward drift of Anglo-Catholicism and the consequent 'Parting of the Ways.'

In dealing with the present situation he once again presses the question as to what is the real position and policy of the Anglo-Catholic leaders.

> It is in view of this that men such as I feel impelled to ask, perhaps with painful vehemence, where some at any rate of the Anglo-Catholic leaders stand. When Mr. Pinchard, on behalf of the English Church Union, says that Modernism is the enemy; when Fr. Wilfred Knox asks that we should adopt the whole ultramontane, counter-Reformation system of Roman devotions—what do they mean theologically? Is *all* Modernism the enemy? Is Rome to be accepted in its entirety? For Rome still stands, at any rate officially, in rooted determination not to make those readjustments in Christian tradition which the new knowledge of the world and its history demand.
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> It is time that it was said that, no matter what the alternative, to accept the proposal to adopt Roman cultus is to pay too great a price for the title of Catholic. It is to disown the Church's obligations to multitudes of people, who have been and are alienated from the old orthodoxy, by its incompatibility with truth latterly come from God to man. No amount of abuse can alter the fact that the truth of the post-Darwinian view of the universe is as firmly established as the post-Copernican. Younger people are now evolutionists by instinct; their view of the world is irretrievably coloured by a cosmogony undreamt of in Bible times. They have been driven in their multitudes away from the old setting of orthodoxy, both Catholic and Protestant. Is there the least hope that any mere allurements of Catholic worship can win them or bring them again to Christian conviction? If that is the hope of some Anglo-Catholics, then they will take rank with the Catholicism, both Roman and Eastern, which by its un-

yielding and crass obscurantism has provoked such disastrous reaction from itself among educated men, and has made it almost inconceivable to younger folk in Continental Universities, that a man, thoroughly alive to modern knowledge, can be a convinced Christian.

The Bishop's question, 'Is *all* Modernism the enemy?' has greatly perturbed the *Church Times*, which deals with his pronouncement in a leading article. The *Church Times* will have nothing to do with Modernism, or Liberalism, or even Liberal Catholicism. Its repudiation is worth citing:

Finally, it may be noticed that the Bishop uses the word Modernism in a sense which is likely to be misunderstood by most of his readers in this country. 'Is *all* Modernism the enemy?' he inquires, clearly meaning by 'Modernism' acceptance of modern scientific outlook and historical method. In this sense it might almost be said that we are all Modernists nowadays. But this is not the sense in which simple people take the word. For good or evil, the word Modernist in common parlance means a person who accepts uncritically certain unorthodox theories without reasonable evidence, and on the strength of such presuppositions throws overboard essential articles of the Christian Faith; it means one who jumps to philosophical conclusions on a prejudice, and ignores historical facts which, on a common-sense view, should be regarded as proved. And, this being so, it is misleading to ordinary folk to use the word in another sense. The same may be said of the word Liberal. Spelt liberal without a capital letter, it presumably denotes one who has an unprejudiced mind and a broad judgment. We claim unhesitatingly to be liberal in that sense. But as originally employed in connexion with religion, the word flaunts a capital initial, and is used to bolster up the arrogant claim of an unorthodox clique to possess a monopoly of intelligence. In fact, in common parlance it means much the same as Modernist. It is misleading, therefore, to confuse the issues by attemping to employ it in any other sense. For this reason we dislike the term Liberal Catholic, which is coming into fashion in some quarters. Whatever it may be intended to mean, there is a danger that the untechnical layman will suppose Liberal Catholic to denote an inward agnostic who outwardly conforms to Catholic ceremonies.

It is of interest to compare the *Church Times*' conception of Modernism with that given by Dr. Headlam in his latest volume:

'The Modernist movement (to give it its newest name), enabled as it is to attack the problems which changes in thought are creating, is seeking to bring philosophy and science into harmony with Christian theology.' [1]

The *Church Times* prefers the term Catholic without any adjuncts, for though it may be an open question whether one can be more Catholic than St. Thomas, there is no question at

[1] *The Church of England* (1924), p. 46.

all that one cannot be more Catholic than the *Church Times*. If 'the untechnical layman' grasps this fact he is secure.

Dr. Talbot's historical criticism, we are glad to note, does not stop short with the Old Testament, but passes into the New. He writes:—

> People write as though such as I abandon loyalty to our Lord and overthrow His authority. Yet I protest that there is nothing incompatible with the firmest belief in the Incarnation to recognize that our Lord, in taking human nature at a certain time and place in history, shared in the general knowledge, science and mental furniture of His generation. Certainly the mystery of the union of the Divine with the human is supremely the subject for a reverent agnosticism. But to ascribe to our Lord, in the days of His Flesh, an omniscience as regards modern scientific and critical questions is to fall disastrously into the heresy to which the devotional mind is ever most prone—namely, Docetism. He did truly become man. To suppose that He knew everything as man is to destroy His manhood.
>
> Yet this is fully compatible with a whole-hearted acceptance of His final authority on the main spiritual verities and values. As Bishop Chandler showed most convincingly, the limitation of His knowledge or mental furniture to that which is representative of His age affects not at all His central apprehension of and disclosure of the essential truths of God and man.

Bishop Talbot seems to have that kind of mind which is most needed to-day by Christian teachers. He is able to welcome all new knowledge, and yet to retain his old moral and spiritual values. He concludes optimistically in very much the same spirit as Bishop Headlam in his recent volume on the Church of England:

> Perhaps, in writing before, I put too strongly considerations which tell powerfully on the one hand against the English Church, and on the other hand in favour of the seductiveness of Rome. Yet I own to a passion of loyalty to the *Ecclesia Anglicana*, just because in her there are powers in activity which Newman found suppressed and atrophied in the Roman Church. We do wrong to be fearful.

As we read these words, it seems to us that 'a Parting of the Ways' coincides with—it is a somewhat Red Sea metaphor—'the Turning of the Tide.'

BARON FRIEDRICH VON HÜGEL

By the Rev. ALFRED FAWKES, M.A., author of *Studies in Modernism, The Genius of the Church of England*, etc.

QUI docti fuerint fulgebunt quasi splendor firmamenti; et qui ad justitiam erudiunt multos quasi stellæ in perpetuas æternitates.[1] 'They that be teachers shall shine as the brightness of the firmament; and they that turn many to righeousness as the stars for ever and ever.'

To how many friends and pupils of Baron von Hügel these words come home to-day! For he was a great religious teacher—the greatest, perhaps, of his generation. His influence was out of all proportion to his condition, which was that of a layman; to his manner of life, which was that of a retired scholar; and to his ecclesiastical allegiance, which was given whole-heartedly to 'the most straitest sect of our religion'—the Church of Rome. But he was what he was. If I may speak of myself—I am but one of many—I have never ceased to reverence him, and my debt to him is great. With the possible exception of Jowett, no one taught me so much, or influenced me so permanently; and, regrettable as what he regarded as my relapse into Protestantism seemed to him, the divergence, I think, was rather logical than religious or philosophical. Our premisses were, to a great extent, the same; but I was, and am, unable to draw his conclusions from them. Temperament, too, and accentuation go for much in these things.

The lines on which his mind moved were not those either of official or popular Catholicism. Hence a certain misfit. He was one of the most distinguished Catholics of his time; since Newman, no one has carried his weight or filled his position. But he lived unrecognised, and died almost unnoticed, by his fellow Catholics. He was too big for his surroundings; the Church has no use for men of his type. On the other hand, the questions with which he occupied himself have lost, in this material age, much of their former interest; the scientific theologian is a survival in a new world. The obituary notices in the *Times*, and even in the *Tablet*, were sympathetic; Abbot Butler,

[1] *Daniel*, xii, 3.

in particular, though he stepped warily where the ice was thin, gave a lifelike picture of the man in his wisdom and his simplicity, in his happy fusion of the natural and the supernatural; with his love of animals, his dislike of everything like pretence or exaggeration, his penetration, his quiet humour, his breeding, his instinct for the real. Involved in controversy as he often was, the controversial temper was foreign to him; whatever he touched, he raised from the level of controversy to that of principle and ideas. His knowledge was encyclopædic; and his exceptionally retentive memory enabled him to produce it at call. It did not overweight him; he had a singular power of exposition: he was never verbose or didactic, but he made you see. He was a polygot; and his cosmopolitan connections and training gave him a European outlook which contrasted sharply with that of our English provincialism: to be brought into contact with him was to obtain the citizenship of a larger world. In my own case he encouraged me to furbish up my German, which had grown rusty since my Eton days; and introduced me to a theology worthy of the name of a theology—to Harnack and Troeltsch, to Wellhausen and Gunkel. Here were 'hills beyond Pentland'! The mist lifted; the landscape stood revealed. With scholars, of whatever creed or nationality, he was at home; outside this small circle, he was perhaps more appreciated by more or less liberalizing High Churchmen, of the type of Bishop Talbot, than by either his own co-religionists or by the distinctly Liberal Churchmen. Certainly his own affinities were with them. Their devotional side appealed to him, and they broadened under his touch. Such as it is, the Modernist strain in Anglo-Catholicism is in great measure due to him.

His relations with his own Church and its authorities, like those of the first Lord Acton, afford matter for conjecture; much may be surmised, little is known. Should his Life and Letters be written candidly rather than discreetly, a uniquely interesting chapter of Modern Church history will be brought to light. For he played an important part in the Modernist movement—prompting, suggesting, establishing points of contact and propaganda. He knew the men, and appraised the situation. He was, in a sense, behind the scenes; but he could be counted upon, and his services as an *officier de liaison* were as valuable

as they were indefatigable. To minds otherwise constituted than his own his interior dialectic remains a mystery. He united the apparently incompatible attitudes of extreme freedom of speculation and extreme deference to ecclesiastical authority: it was not only that they lay in him side by side unreconciled, but that he seemed unaware that their reconciliation was a problem; and sat, without apparent difficulty, upon two stools. A *jeu d'esprit* attributed to Father Tyrrell illustrates this. It took the shape of an imaginary conversation between von Hügel and himself:

> H.: 'There can be no doubt that our Lady failed to occupy her proper place at the Crucifixion; the evidence of the Synoptic writers makes this clear.'
>
> T.: 'Yes? But it is a long way from this to the *Salve Regina.*'
>
> H.: 'There can be no doubt that our Lord's faith broke down on Calvary.' [*Cf. Mark*, xv, 34.]
>
> T.: 'Yes? But it is a long way from this to the Nicene Creed.'
>
> H.: 'There can be no doubt that St. Paul's teaching as to the Eucharist [I *Cor.*, x, 16-17] is based on certain forms of Syrian Nature-worship.'
>
> T.: 'Yes? But it is a long way from this to the *Tantum Ergo.*'
>
> H.: 'I hear the Angelus; and I must go and make my evening visit to the Blessed Sacrament.'

The conversation, needless to say, is fictitious. But there is an element of the *ben trovato* in it. It was not easy to reconcile his *lex credendi* with his *lex orandi*. 'I admire,' said Father Ryder, 'the reverent decorum with which he extinguishes the lights on the altar one after another.' He did not, however, see that few can occupy the two positions, the traditional and the scientific, simultaneously; and he was at once surprised and pained when he found that people were unable to do so. Yet for the great majority to attempt it is to enter upon a road that has no turning; the end may be reached sooner or later, but it can be foreseen. For Catholicism is an arrest of development: to develop is to have left it behind.

From the point of view of the Pope, in particular of such a Pope as Pius X, he was a real danger. He held, and encouraged others to hold, views of Scripture and of Church history which were incompatible with the received Catholic teaching; which were calculated to lead those who held them to sit loose to this teaching and to the authority which imposes it; and which only a miracle could save from formal condemna-

tion. He himself, we have seen, was able to steer a middle course between the Scylla of revolt and the Charybdis of Ultramontane orthodoxy. How this was so is not clear. The writer in the *Times* ascribes it to his distrust of the philosophy of Immanence; Abbot Butler to his dread of Monism. But he was too sound a philosopher to take either doctrine as absolute. Both, like their contraries, are relative; the synthesis of reality includes each of the two pairs in one whole. Unless I am much mistaken, the key to the enigma is to be found in an entirely different direction. He believed that the main stream of the religious experience of mankind was to be found in the Roman Catholic Church. And, for him, this was what mattered. Its absolutism and its internecine conflict with ideas were, not indeed indifferent—the value of Modernism was that it had been an attempt, though an unsuccessful attempt, to overcome them —but secondary; and (he persuaded himself) temporary. The defeat of the movement only shewed that it was not for us to know the times and the seasons; we must wait. At times he oscillated between the mystical twilight and a *lumen siccum.* I remember his quoting Troeltsch to the effect that Churches were evils, but necessary evils. 'Therefore (he says) stay in your Church. In the Roman Church—well, if you can: in any other certainly.' But I am not sure that he would have liked to be reminded of this! And the mood was, probably, passing. At the time of the Modernist rout, when he felt that his own future, as far as the Church could affect it, trembled in the balance he fell back upon the famous passage of St. Augustine:[2]

> 'The Divine Providence often permits even good men to be driven out of a Christian congregation on account of the dissensions of carnal men. And this wrong and shameful treatment good men will endure very patiently for the peace of the Church, nor will they foment schismatical and heretical novelties, but will rather teach mankind with what deep and sincere love God ought to be served. . . . These the Father who sees in secret crowns in secret.'

[2] 'Saepe sinit divina providentia per nonnullas nimium turbulentas carnalium hominum seditiones expelli de congregatione christiana etiam bonos viros. Quam contumeliam vel injuriam suam cum patientissime pro ecclesiae pace tulerint, neque ullas novitates, vel schismatis vel haeresis, moliti fuerint, docebunt homines quam vero affectu et quanta sinceritate charitatis Deo serviendum sit. . . . Hos coronat in occulto Pater in occulto videns.' (*De Vera Religione,* ch. vi.)

I do not doubt that this is the narrow path which, in case o necessity, he would have chosen. The necessity, happily, di not arise. And, if to the end the memories of past conflict were with him, at evening time there was peace. Such a life i not a failure. For the soil that has been watered by the tear of the just is fruitful.

'We travelled in the print of olden wars,
Yet all the land was green,
And love we found and peace
Where fire and war had been.

They pass and smile, the children of the sword—
No more the sword they wield;
And O, how deep the corn
Along the battlefield!'

By the kind permission of M. Alfred Loisy, of the Collège de France, I am enabled to communicate to the *Modern Churchman* the following appreciation of Baron von Hügel taken from a letter to a friend:

'Je ne suis pas éloigné de penser que le principal dans la vie de notre ami regretté n'est pas sa participation, d'ailleurs très active et très dévoué, au mouvement moderniste—qui fut une tentative avortie —mais son existence et son œuvre de croyant mystique, adonné en même temps à la philosophie et aux sciences religieuses. A cet égard il était comme un paradoxe vivant. Ame celtique et esprit allemand. Il n'est pas probable que son œuvre laisse une trace bien considérable dans l'église romaine; mais il pourra conserver assez longtemps le crédit qu'il avait su gagner du côté des christianismes réformés.

Il n'a jamais été au premier plan du mouvement moderniste, dont il n'avait pas eu l'initiative; mais on peut dire qu'il a été auprès de tous ceux qui y ont pris part, les encourageant et les assistant jusqu' au jour de la débâcle et même jusqu'au lendemain. On ne peut pas dire qu'il ait dirigé le mouvement, qui ne fut jamais dirigé par personne, et résulta d'actions personnelles non co-ordonnées. Le bon baron se fit agent de liaison et ne chercha jamais à être chef. Peut-être avait-il plus de foi en l'avenir du modernisme que ceux qui déchainérent l'aventure. Sa foi en modernisme était soutenue par sa foi au catholicisme, qu'il s'obstinait à croire réformable. Le modernisme abattu, il pensa que c'était partie remise, et que le catholicisme s'élargerait plus tard. L'attitude finale de Tyrrell, l'issue de ma carrière, lui furent très pénibles. Tyrrell s'était révolté contre l'église et moi je l'avais abandonné. Chose inconcevable pour lui et blâmable. Duchesne était sa consolation, bien que Duchesne, au fond, n'eût pas grande confiance dans l'avenir du catholicisme, mais il ne voulait pas la quitter. L'optimisme mystique de von Hügel l'empêchait de mesurer la la profondeur du marécage scolastico-politique où s'est enlisée l'église romaine. Il semble pourtant qu'on ne puisse guère compter sur elle pour sauver la vieille Europe de la ruine qui la menace.'

THE NUMINOUS

By F. L. Cross, B.A., B.Sc., sometime Scholar of Balliol College, and Tutor of Ripon Hall, Oxford.

RECENTLY our interest in modern German theology, which the war cut short, has been revived. But it is an interest of a different kind from that of ten years ago. For, whereas our interest then was mainly concentrated in the critical and historical investigations of theological problems by German scholars, it has been directed recently to the more systematic side. This is not remarkable when we consider that there has been a great dearth of good critical work in that country during the last few years. For example, no work comparable in merit or importance with Canon Streeter's recent treatise on the four Gospels has appeared in Germany during the last decade. But a number of works of importance in the field of systematic theology have seen the light, and these treatises are now being widely read in this country. In particular does this apply to those of Ernst Troeltsch, Friedrich Heiler, and Rudolf Otto; and, perhaps above all, to the works of the last-named. For Otto's great work,[1] after having gone through several editions in Germany since its first publication in 1917, has probably, through Mr. J. W. Harvey's recent admirable translation,[2] drawn more attention to it than any other work in systematic theology published in England in 1924. It is in this work that Professor Otto develops his ideas about the nature of the 'numinous' and its importance in religion. Some of the many problems raised by his conception and treatment of it will be considered in this article.

Prof. Otto leads up to his characterization of the numinous by a consideration of the meaning of 'holiness.' This, he tells us, is 'a category of interpretation and valuation peculiar to the sphere of religion' (p. 5). It is in its very nature different in meaning from goodness; for, while goodness is a term of ethical, holiness is a term of religious, connotation. Holiness, however, does not exclude the moral; on the contrary, it necessarily implies it. But it is yet something more than the moral; and it

[1] *Das Heilige*, Breslau, 1925. [2] *The Idea of the Holy*, Oxford, 1924.

is just this 'something more than the moral' in holiness to which Otto applies the term 'numinous.' The derivation of the word —for the word has been coined by Otto, though there is little doubt that it will occupy a permanent place in the vocabulary of technical theology—is from the Latin *numen* (godhead) on the analogy of ominous from *omen*.

An account of a certain experience in the ex-Emperor of Germany's just-published *Erinnerungen an Corfu* (Leipzig 1924) will afford a good illustration of the phenomena which Otto terms the 'numinous.' The Kaiser is narrating the impression which the natural charm and majesty of the island made upon him on his first arrival there in 1908:

> 'Expressions of astonishment,' he writes, 'were impossible. Deep silence had taken possession of us all. Rapt in devotion, we Germans who had fled from the noisy, snow-enveloped Berlin, were revelling in the beauty spot of creation, which turned our hearts to the Creator. . . . Someone standing near me whispered quietly to me: "Here words fail you; here only worship is possible; here God is near." For long, for very long, we stood with our companions in awed admiration before the great work of God, before His majestic Nature. Then we returned quietly back through the enchanting gardens, each to his own apartment, each preoccupied with the consideration of what he had seen, with what was best expressed in: "Light is Thy garment which Thou wearest. Lord, how many and great are Thy works. In wisdom hast Thou made them all. The earth is full of Thy glory."

There are few who have not at some time of their life had an experience such as is here described. For such as have not Otto frankly says that his treatise will appear incomprehensible and they may as well close it again at the outset. For the experience here described is a typical example of the group of phenomena which the author of *The Idea of the Holy* designates as numinous. Numinous experiences are such as are called forth in the religious soul when it feels itself awed by the majestic presence of its Creator; they are those experiences associated with our 'Creature-consciousness' (*Kreatur-gefühl*) at a more primitive stage of development they are closely connected with the fear of demons and the horror of the uncanny. Indeed, they play an important part—Otto would say a fundamental part—in religious life at all its stages, even the highest. In the Old Testament, examples of the numinous are very frequent. Yahweh is throughout conceived of as a God capable of wrath, and as such evokes trembling awe in the soul of His

worshipper. When Jacob awoke at Bethel after the revelation from Yahweh, 'he was afraid and said, "How dreadful is this place! This is none other but the house of God and this is the gate of heaven."' (*Gen.* xxviii, 17). Isaiah's inaugural vision —so grandly depicted in the sixth chapter of that prophet's writings—is another example. The prophet sees Yahweh, seated high and lifted up on His throne, surrounded by the Seraphim. The sight overwhelms him. He cries out: 'Woe is me, for I am undone; for mine eyes have seen Yahweh Sebaoth' (vi, 5). In the New Testament, too, the numinous often, though less often, occurs. Jesus is related as having produced a numinous effect upon His followers. The feeling of horror which took hold of the disciples when they recognized that the journey up to Jerusalem was the prelude to events of the greatest religious significance is well described in *Mk.* x, 42: 'And they were in the way, going up to Jerusalem; and Jesus was going up before them; and they were amazed; and they that followed were afraid.' Jesus' powers over nature can evoke similar sentiments in St. Peter. The feeling of his own weakness over against the Master's power and purity occasions in him feelings of the deepest self-abasement. 'Depart from me,' he says (*Lk.* v, 8), 'for I am a sinful man, O Lord.' And so right through the history of the Church, experiences of this kind have been closely bound up in many—perhaps, in most—minds with the deepest expressions of religion. Our great Gothic cathedrals have always awakened such feelings. But above all is this true of the rites of the Eucharist. What Mr. A. E. J. Rawlinson says[3] of the Roman Mass is to a large extent true of the English liturgy:

> 'The dramatic symbolism of the liturgical acts of the celebrant, the archaistic use of the Latin tongue, the still murmur of the consecratory prayer, the aesthetic appeal of the ceremonial, the atmosphere of devotion and the sense of mystery which normally characterise the service, all contribute to suggest powerfully the approach of an awe-struck and worshipping people to the ultimate mystery of the Divine Holiness—in Rudolf Otto's terminology, to God as *Numinosum, Fascinosum, Mysterium, Tremendum.*'

Silence always produces in the mind of the worshipper numinous effects: and Otto rightly recognizes

> 'the plainest inward kinship between [the] two forms of worship

[3] *Authority and Freedom*, p. 36.

which, viewed externally, seem to stand at the opposite poles of religious development, *viz.*, the Quaker meeting and the Roman Catholic Mass.'[4]

The indefinability of the numinous—on which Otto lays so much stress—must necessarily render any concise explanation of it impossible. It is hoped that the few concrete examples given will serve to illustrate its nature better than any attempted systematic exposition could do. Indeed, the very awe which it evokes thereby stuns us into silence; and if the difficulty which psychologists find in describing such feelings as those of anger is very great because as soon as the mind introspects what it has experienced the anger thereby ceases, still more so must this be the case with the numinous, which awes the religious soul at once to silence. But, if we cannot define anger, we can have some knowledge as to what it is. And so with the numinous. Adequate definition of it is impossible. If the examples which have been referred to have been insufficient to convey to the reader's mind what the numinous is, we can only recommend the reading of Prof. Otto's treatise itself, where a much larger number are discussed and analysed in a way that is impossible here.

The great service which Otto has rendered in grouping these phenomena together, and recognising the important part which, in all religious life, they have played and still continue to play, is indisputable. It is true that as religion develops the numinous undergoes a certain degree of 'rationalization' and 'moralization'; in this way the numinous becomes the 'holy.' Yet the numinous elements still remain; they will not be, Otto asserts, ultimately superseded. No. The numinous is fundamental to religious experience. Hence there remains to the very end a large element of the indescribable—as Otto says, of the non-rational—in the object and content of religious experience.

The belief that religion implies the existence of non-rational elements in the Universe raises a problem of fundamental importance. In fact, the question as to the complete rationality of the whole Universe is one of the fundamental problems of philosophy. It is the great question which divides the Hegelians from the Kantians. Otto's affinities have always been with Kant. If he has been less persistent in pointing out his ad-

[4] *Op. cit.* p. 218.

miration for that philosopher than the so-called Marburg Neo-Kantians, he stands in reality much nearer to him. The watch-word of the great Hermann Cohen (died in 1918), the leader of the Marburg Neo-Kantians, was '*Kant verstehen, Heisst über ihn hinausgehen*' ('To understand Kant demands that we should go beyond Kant'); and these words have been the energising force behind the movement. But its leaders went beyond Kant just at the central point of his teaching; they eliminated the 'thing-in-itself,' and therewith the core of the Critical Philosophy. Neo-Kantian epistemology differs little from Hegelian metaphysics. We are not far wrong in asserting of the former the central dogma of the latter—'*the real is the rational and the rational is the real.*' This is pointed out, since the common association of Prof. Otto and an important school of Neo-Kantianism with Marburg might easily lead to the supposition that Otto derived his Kantianism from that source.

The relative merits of (true) Kantianism and Hegelianism cannot be here discussed. If it be urged that the latter theory possesses the greater logical consistency—a consistency hardly possible on the Kantian 'dualism'—this is no argument for its acceptance, since the point in question is thereby assumed. But there is no doubt that the prevailing belief in English theology at the present time is that in the rationality of the Universe. Usually some twenty years or more are required before new developments of philosophic thought exercise a powerful influence on theological opinion; and it often happens that theology is the home of lost philosophic causes, though this can hardly be said of Neo-Hegelianism, which is still regarded by many English philosophers as the greatest achievement of modern thought. The fact is, that the great influence exercised by the school of T. H. Green and F. H. Bradley in the sphere of metaphysics is now dominant in the sphere of English theology; and it is the prevailing assumption that every entity in the Universe of the religious man must be capable of explanation in rational terms.

Along these lines, Otto's conclusions have been recently subjected to a severe criticism by the Rev. Leonard Hodgson.[5] Mr. Hodgson is quite ready to admit the limitations of our

[5] *The Place of Reason in Christian Apologetic*, Oxford, 1925.

minds to solve ultimate philosophic problems in our present state of intellectual development:

> 'The limitations of human reason are two,' he tells us (p. 51), 'and both arise from our existence as finite beings at particular times in the history of the world. The first limitation is due to the fact that we are not sufficiently rational . . . . The remedy for this is, of course, education. The second limitation arises from the complexity of the subject matter with which our reason has to deal. . . . Here again the remedy is education.'

In the end, philosophy will be able to solve all the problems of the Universe—even such as now lie altogether outside the range of its investigation; and hence any designation of the Ultimate Reality of Religion as non-rational is necessarily mistaken.

Now with Mr. Hodgson's thesis that, as education advances, we shall get an ever-clearer understanding of many of the fundamental problems of Religion and Philosophy, no one can quarrel. We are unable to hold much of what the Greeks held; and theology has not only nothing to fear (though our obscurantists would maintain otherwise), but rather much to gain, from the application to it of the assured results of modern science. But we are much more doubtful if such education will lead ultimately to the solution of *all* problems. And for this conclusion three reasons may be urged:

(1) Such a theory necessarily involves logical determinism. If the whole of the Universe has been bound to develop along lines prescribed in the very beginning by the laws of thought, and will continue to develop along these lines for all time, then any free action (*i.e.*, an action not predetermined) either by God or man is impossible. Intercessory prayer becomes thereby valueless; morality becomes thereby a delusion. After a man has done an immoral action, he can rightly say that he was not responsible for it; for, however much he had tried, he could not have done otherwise. Freedom is, in its very nature, not explicable in a rationally determined world. In fact, it appears that this very inapplicability of our rational categories to the problem of freedom is what renders all attempts at a rational account of freedom unsatisfactory.

(2) The great philosophic 'antinomies'—which played such an important part in the development of Kant's critical philosophy[6]—appear to be insoluble. They are, that is to say, *true*

[6] *Cf. Kritik der reinen Vernunft,*[2] pp. 432 *ff.*

antinomies (for an antinomy ceases to be such when it is resolved). From the time when Zeno formulated his famous paradoxes, the same antinomies have appeared again and again in philosophy in one form or another. The solution which Kant himself attempted was hardly possible on his own Critical Principles. And a study of Hegel's *Logik* only confirms our conclusion. For this work is a real hunting-ground for antinomies. Here Hegel discovers antinomy after antinomy which his more 'irrational' predecessors had not recognised. Hegel, indeed, thinks that he can resolve each antinomy as it arises; the thesis and the antithesis must be combined in a 'higher synthesis.' But it is just these syntheses which appear so dubious. Again and again we must face the question whether any real synthesis has been effected. But the curious, yet interesting, fact remains that no one in modern times appears to have discovered so many genuine antinomies in the universe as G. W. F. Hegel.

(3) Our remaining consideration is an empirical one. What do we find as science advances? Does the progress of knowledge reduce the problems under discussion? The solution of any one problem usually leads to the opening up of numerous other problems hitherto unrecognized. We know much more about the nature of the atom than we did some thirty years ago; but it is doubtful if we are any nearer a solution of the problem of the constitution of matter. Our problems are ever increasing, not diminishing. Questions which would thirty years ago have been meaningless have now arisen. What is the nature of the electrons? Of the supposed positive nucleus of the atoms? In what relationship to the nucleus do the electrons stand? With what velocity do they move? Or again, to take an example from the sphere of literary criticism. We know that 'Q' and Mark are the main sources of Matthew and Luke.[7] But there arise now a whole string of problems, such as that regarding the actual extent of 'Q,' that regarding *its* underlying sources, that as to the relationship of 'Q' with Mark. Only with the isolation of 'Q,' of course, could such problems have arisen. This fact—be it only an empirical one (I see no way of grounding it *a priori*)—is one which certainly points away from the belief that the development of know-

[7] This is substantially true, even on Canon Streeter's modification of the usual hypothesis.

ledge is likely to bring us ultimately to a complete understanding of the Universe.

This digression into the realms of philosophy has been rendered necessary for any appreciation of the justice of the main criticisms urged against Prof. Otto's book. We venture to believe that there is still a good case to be made out for theories of the Universe which refuse to acknowledge that thought can ever adequately or fully comprehend it. We disagree with the contention that 'the presupposition of all thought is the rationality of the Universe.'[8] The Universe may be partly rational and partly irrational; this alone is the necessary presupposition for thought. The complete identity of thought and being, asserted by Parmenides of old, must be replaced, it seems to us, by an assertion of partial identity; further than this the facts appear to prevent our going.

It is this complete rationality of the Universe which Otto denies. He maintains that Religion is more than practical metaphysics and ethics. Here, of course, he shews considerable affinities with Schleiermacher, whose *Reden über die Religion* he has recently edited. He recognises the danger of religion becoming 'sicklied o'er with the pale cast of thought,' and losing thereby all its vitality. Our present age is an age of education and, in many respects, an age of a high standard of general morality. But it can hardly be said to be an age of religious fervour. Religion, it must be recognised, is something more than the possession of a right theory of the Universe, and the living of a morally good life—and perhaps combined with these the appreciation of certain aesthetic values. Religion, if it be true religion, while recognizing the value of these, must consecrate them to higher purposes, and know that it is something more than such things. Its vocabulary includes such words as sin,[9] redemption, faith—things of which the 'natural man' knows nothing. In so far as they contain scientific or moral elements, they must harmonise with the data of natural and moral philosophy. Only in this way is religion to be kept free from degenerating into superstition and licentiousness. But it is more than these. When the limits of natural theology are reached—as St. Paul found they

[8] L. Hodgson, *op. cit.* 51.

[9] Otto hold the difference between sin and unrighteousness to be the difference between religious and ethical devaluation.

were in his argument in *Rom.* ix.-xi.—religious faith bears a witness which is unaffected by any philosophical considerations. Faith cries out with St. Paul:

> 'O the depth of the riches, both of the wisdom and the knowledge of God! How unsearchable are His judgments and His ways past tracing out! For who hath known the mind of the Lord? or who hath been His counsellor? or who hath first given to Him, and it shall be recompensed unto him again? For of Him and through Him and unto Him are all things. To Him be the glory for ever' (*Rom.* xi, 33-36).

There are two criticisms of Prof. Otto's conclusions which we should like to add.

(1) We doubt whether the phenomena which Otto describes as characteristically numinous adequately represent *all* the non-rational and non-moral elements in religion. The term numinous had better be reserved for those phenomena which he describes, and for them alone. If we believe that Christianity is the absolute religion—even if we believe that it is the highest religion yet evolved—we should expect in Christianity the numinous element (in the sense just mentioned) to have reached its highest development. We are in doubt whether this is the case. Rather is it at the more primitive stages of culture that the numinous occupies such an important place in the religious life; for, as religion develops, the more ecstatic elements of it are gradually superseded. But they are not thereby 'rationalised.' However we may regard the four cardinal virtues (if we may use here the Scholastic distinction), the three theological virtues of faith, hope, and love are definitely non-rational.[10] The latter have been well described as the 'unequal' virtues; and, even if it were true that in Christian experience the numinous should be in the end completely transformed into love (for surely the highest revelation which we have of God is the revelation that He is Love), then we should still be predicating of the Divine a non-rational character. Still more is this the case if we assign any permanent validity to such conceptions as those of Atonement. For Atonement is not only non-rational; it is also non-ethical. Yet it is not thereby non-religious. And likewise as regards mystic experience:

> 'As I lose myself in the infinite main
> Like a soul that has sinned and is pardoned again.'[11]

[10] Were it not for Otto's usage, 'supra-rational' would, in many respects, be preferable to 'non-rational,' both here and elsewhere.

[11] *Poems* of Charles Kingsley (in *Songs from 'The Water Babies'*) London, 1877 (p. 284).

is the expression of an experience which transcends all rational explanation. It is 'the peace of God, which passeth all understanding.'

The numinous, then, is not the only element in religion which remains inexplicable from the rationalist standpoint; all that we would urge is that Christianity can, even at its highest, find a place for it, and a place alongside experiences such as those of love.

(2) In an Appendix,[11] Otto discusses the relation between numinous experience and Divine Personality, and comes to the conclusion that such experience points to the Godhead as being supra-personal. His argument appears to be based on the testimony of certain mystics. It is, indeed, true that the numinous may be evoked by objects which are not of a personal character, such as is the case with certain Gothic buildings. But, as the witness of the Old Testament illustrates, Yahweh, who again and again calls forth the numinous in his worshippers, is throughout conceived as Personal. That the problem as to the relation between 'Personality' and 'Supra-personality' is a different one from that between 'Theism' and 'Pantheism' we fully agree.[13] Yet the two problems are closely allied. It will generally be found that those who hold a pantheistic view of the Universe are unable to attach any meaning to the expression 'the Personality of God.' It appears to be just the numinous elements in the religious experiences of the saints of the Old Covenant which convinced them that He was a 'living God';[14] and the arguments adduced by Hermann Lotze and Prof. C. C. J. Webb, two of the chief exponents of the doctrine of Divine Personality in recent times, appear to receive the support of religious experience in the light of the phenomena emphasized by Otto. As a recent critic of Otto has expressed it, 'the opposition of the two fundamental and complementary religious sentiments of Otto (*tremendum* and *fascinans*) allows a new and genuinely religious elaboration of the doctrine of personality. But the supremely important element of personality ought, it seems to us, to have been incorporated into the Divine mystery, instead of being abandoned exclusively to the rational philosophy of religion.'[15]

[12] *Op cit.*, pp. 201-208. [13] *Cf.* Otto, *op. cit.* p. 207.

[14] The Semitic way of expressing 'Divine Personality.'

[15] *A Lemaître: La pensée religieuse de Rudolf Otto et le mystère du divin.* (Lausanne, 1924; p. 117).

ROMAN CATHOLIC HISTORY

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THIS paper is not directed against the rank and file of Roman Catholics, nor against the inner spiritual life of any man. It deals not with the positive, but with the negative factors in the Roman creed. A Roman Catholic takes an impregnable position so long as he says simply: 'My Church's answer to the riddle of the universe is to me the most convincing of all; her sacraments bring me nearer to God than anything else I can conceive.' It is only when he goes beyond this, and belittles other men's faith and other men's approaches to God, that he compels us to ask whether this peculiar truth which he boasts be not, at bottom, peculiar falsehood. His attitude challenges the question, 'By what authority?' and, having provoked this challenge, he must then risk the blame which attaches to a boaster's silence or falsehoods. The rank and file do indeed seldom talk like this; they go very much their own way, leaving the priest to speak for them; the priest, again, generally relies upon the professional apologist behind him. I deal here, therefore, primarily with these professional apologists alone, and with others only in so far as they knowingly condone or encourage the falsehoods to which these men have too frequently committed themselves.

I shall endeavour to prove in this paper: (1) That the two greatest Roman Catholic writers in the English language, Newman and Acton, have condemned their co-religionists in words which could not justly be applied to any other of the great religious denominations, and which have not in fact been applied to them by their own great writers. (2) That Cardinal Manning, in defence of his creed, practically prophesies those results which Newman and Acton lament as accomplished facts; and (3) that these wider generalizations are abundantly justified in detail by actual concrete instances; since, in spite of honourable exceptions, Roman Catholics of the greatest reputation sometimes show an appalling indifference to easily-ascertainable truth.

Let me take these points in order.

I (*a*) Cardinal Newman wrote as follows to Father Coleridge

in July, 1864, nine years after his admission to the Roman Church:

> 'I have nothing worth writing in answer to your letter of this morning—but I do not like to be silent. I forget what I said to you in the letter to which you refer—but I fear I am less and less sanguine about any periodical. I said I would do something for *The Month*, as you had done, but it would be nothing out of the way and without any great hope. Nothing would be better than an Historical Review—but who would bear it? Unless one doctored all one's facts, one should [*sic*] be thought a bad Catholic. The truth is, there is a keen conflict going on just now between two parties, one in the Church, one out of it—and at such seasons extreme views alone are in favour, and a man who is not extravagant is thought treacherous. I sometimes think of King Lear's daughter, and consider that they after all may be found the truest who are in speech more measured.'

(*b*) In 1876, Lord Acton wrote as follows to Mary Gladstone, not in haste, but deliberately, keeping a copy which was found among his papers and edited by Messrs. Figgis and Laurence:

> 'In short, I do not believe that there are Catholics who sincerely and intelligently believe that Rome is right and that Döllinger is wrong [as to the history of Infallibility]. And therefore I think that you are too hard on Ultramontanes, or too gentle with Ultramontanism. You say, for instance, that it promotes untruthfulness. I don't think that is fair. It not only promotes, it inculcates distinct mendacity and deceitfulness. In certain cases it is made a duty to lie. But those who teach this doctrine do not become habitual liars in other things.'

These words would seem plain enough: let us now consider the arguments by which Father Leslie Walker, S.J., has tried to prove that neither Newman nor Acton meant what he seemed to say.

In *The Yorkshire Post*, he argued that the face-interpretation of Newman's words is disproved by the fact that they 'first saw the light in a Catholic periodical, *The Month*. Had *The Month* desired to "doctor" facts, it would have "edited" it.' My reply was obvious: first, that this is exactly the argument by which, nearly a thousand years ago, Pope Nicholas I defended the genuineness of the Forged Decretals, in which Father Walker no more believes now than I do; and, secondly, that nobody ever dreamed of reading the word *impossibility* into this passage where Newman only complains of the *extreme difficulty* of historical veracity: therefore (I argued) 'the fact that one Roman Catholic writer sometimes tells the truth in history is no disproof of Newman's general condemnation.' This point, therefore, Father Walker dropped in his next letter: for it is well known that some of the most important documents in

Church history, as in political history, have come to light because some private reason for publication outweighed the general reasons for secrecy: they are of the nature of indiscretions.

His other main point was, that Newman's letter referred to special circumstances of that time which are no longer applicable: 'The time' (writes Father Walker) 'was unpropitious. The feeling between Gallicans and Ultramontanes was running too high.' But the Gallican and Ultramontane parties of 1864 were both orthodox Catholics; neither had a right to accuse the other of heresy; their most fundamental difference was on the point of Papal infallibility.[1] If, then, Newman was thinking only, or even mainly, of the Gallican-Ultramontane quarrel, why did he write, 'The truth is, there is a keen conflict going on just now between the two parties, *One in the Church, one out of it*'? Father Walker explains, in *The Dublin Review* (p. 195), that Newman can hardly here refer to Protestants and Catholics, 'since he would not speak of Catholics as a "party within the Church."' Has Father Walker forgotten Newman's famous letter of January 28th, 1870, written 'with great deliberation,' where he stigmatized that powerful party which was then urging the decree of Infallibility as 'an insolent and aggressive faction'? No man will deny that faction to have been *within the Church*. How, then, can we reasonably doubt that Newman meant what he said in 1864? There was this Ultramontane party within the Church, and there was a party outside which the Ultramontane manœuvres stirred to increasing bitterness; men who had always condemned the idea of any man's Infallibility as an absurd pretension, and were now ready to condemn it as blasphemous and criminal. In these circumstances (says Newman) you must howl with the extreme party in your own Church,

[1] See The Century Dictionary, *s.v. Ultramontanism*, 'The doctrines of the Ultramontanes; the views of that party in the Church of Rome which places an absolute authority in matters of faith and discipline in the hands of the Pope, in opposition to the views of that party which would place the national churches, such as the Gallican, in partial independence of the Roman curia, and make the Pope subordinate to the statutes of an ecumenical council. According to ultramontanism, the Pope is superior to general Councils, independent of their decrees, and is considered to be the source of all jurisprudence in the church. The Vatican Council of 1869-70 virtually established the views of ultramontanism as dogma of the Roman Catholic Church.'

or be taken for an enemy. And he spoke from personal experience. Only a few weeks before, in this same year, Newman had written to his most intimate friend, Ambrose St. John:

> 'It is a marvel that the Bishop suffers me, that he suffers us, considering his exceeding suspiciousness about people near me, whom he seems to think heretics, and his taking any lukewarmness about the Temporal Power, and any tolerance of Napoleon [III], as synonymous with laxity of faith.' [2]

He was regarded by many of his fellow-Catholics as 'a half-sympathizer with Garibaldi,' the arch-enemy of the Papacy in Italy; 'it was said, I had preached in favour of Garibaldi, had subscribed to the Garibaldi fund, etc.'[3] Therefore he meant what his words to Father Coleridge plainly imply; if any man disapproved of these excited Infallibilists inside the Church, then he was suspected of complicity with the extremists outside. Newman, it is true, specifies in a nearly contemporaneous letter 'one circumstance, peculiar to the time, to give a special intensity to this feeling of suspicion. At present the Temporal Power is the all-important point at Rome.'[4] But the Infallibility question, when it came from the background to the front, caused an even more fundamental division than this; and, after all, even the matter of the Temporal Power is still a burning question. Therefore, although Newman complained of the difficulties of 1864 as 'peculiar,' yet time has falsified this estimate. It is as true to-day as it was in 1864 that there are two violently-opposed parties, one inside and one outside the Church. There are Infallibilists like Father Woodlock, S.J., who can write:

> 'The personal infallibility and supremacy of the Pope is now such a defined dogma, and will *for all time* be held by the members of the Roman Catholic Church as tenaciously as they hold to the Godhead of Christ. Both doctrines come to them through the same teaching authority, and to deny either of them is to deny the authority upon which both rest.' [5]

Compare this with pp. 2-3 of *The Alleged Failures of Infallibility*, written by Fr. Coupe, S.J., and circulated in thousands by the Catholic Truth Society. Here we are told that, if one single Pope can be proved to have taught error *ex cathedra*, 'the Catholic Church collapses like a house of cards, and Christianity collapses with it.'

> 'If there be no such teacher [as an infallible Pope] to enlighten us, then Christianity is a delusion and a dream, and there is nothing

[2] Ward, II, 50. [3] *Ibid.* I, 526. [4] *Ibid.* III, 581; *cf.* 585.
[5] *Morning Post*, August 6th, 1923, p. 6.

for us but, like the pagans of old, to cry out in anguish and desolation of heart, "God there is none, Future life there is none. Let us drink and make merry, for to-morrow we die."'

How can people in this state of mind treat history as history? How can they permit their fellow-Romanists to look historically into certain historical questions? The man to whom it is a 'question' is already a 'bad Catholic.' Here, then, we have the explanation of Acton's words. Acton wrote in 1876, when Newman's aggravating element of 1864, the Temporal Power, had already paled before that of Infallibility. Acton knew the truth of Döllinger's complaint, that the bishops who formed the immense majority in 1870 had been misled by the official text-books of their seminaries, 'seeing that the documentary proofs contained in those books are to a great extent false, invented, or garbled.'[6] Although Acton himself managed te keep the peace with a Church indisposed to attack a subject still more formidable than Döllinger, yet there can be no doubt that he meant what he wrote in 1876; for he deliberately kept a copy of this letter to Mary Gladstone. He meant what he said, that the Ultramontane position made it impossible for men to face historical facts on this Infallibility question.

II This brings me to my second point. What Acton here bewails as an accomplished fact, Manning had anticipated long ago, when he wrote that the appeal to history, in the face of the Church's decisions, is a treason and a heresy. He explained those words afterwards in *The Daily Telegraph* for October 8, 1875; and his explanation clinches the present argument. From the moment when Infallibility was decreed in 1870, one of the most important of all historical questions could no longer be a question for any orthodox Roman Catholic. Even to enquire by ordinary unbiased historical methods whether St. Peter was ever Bishop of Rome is practically to separate oneself from the present Roman Church. To this question of historical fact the answer is dictated to the Ultramontane beforehand. What Acton exposed is the logical and inevitable consequence of the principle laid down by Manning.

III And, thirdly, we have startling concrete facts in support of Acton's and Newman's generalizations. Even Newman's

[6] For full quotations see p. 136 of *Anglican Essays*.

lofty character is not entirely above reproach here. Father Walker has twice emphasized the fact that Newman, practically at the time of this Coleridge letter, was writing the *Apologia* against Kingsley's attack. But, to begin with, Father Walker quotes no passage of the *Apologia* to prove real inconsistency with the Coleridge letter. Unquestionably Newman does defend the clergy against Kingsley's exaggerated accusations; but that by itself is far from conclusive. The just indignation there shown may easily conceal, without contradicting, Newman's smothered disgust at the things that were being done by some of his colleagues . He himself explains that he has set himself indirectly to vindicate his fellows as a body, by meeting Kingsley's point of attack upon his own personal conduct; and indeed he did this triumphantly in the main.[7] Moreover, his vindication of his fellow-clergy is not only indirect, but it is distinctly economical of truth; for, after the first opening words, he side-tracks the question by persistently confusing two issues which his keenly logical mind can scarcely have failed to separate—the question of priestly *veracity in controversy* and of priestly *religious faith.* He writes (ed. 1880, p. 270; italics mine):

> 'And thus I am brought to *the direct question of truth,* and of the truthfulness of Catholic priests generally in their dealings with the world, as bearing on the general question of their honesty, *and of their internal belief in their religious professions.* It would answer no purpose, and it would be departing from the line of writing which I have been observing all along, if I entered into any formal discussion on this question; what I shall do here, as I have done in the foregoing pages, is to give my own testimony on the matter in question, and there to leave it. Now first I will say that, when I became a Catholic, nothing struck me more at once than the English outspoken manner of the Priests. It was the same at Oscott, at Old Hall Green, at Ushaw; there was nothing of that smoothness, or mannerism, which is commonly imputed to them, and they were more natural and unaffected than many an Anglican clergyman. The many years which have passed since have only confirmed my first impression. I have ever found it in the priests of this Diocese; *did I wish to point out a straightforward Englishman, I should instance the Bishop, who has, to our great benefit, for so many years presided over it.* And next, I was struck, when I had more opportunity of judging of the Priests,

[7] *Eg.* Ward, II, p. 21. 'There is no idea whatever of giving any point to what I am writing [in the *Apologia*] but that I did not act dishonestly.' Again, p. 24: 'So far as my character is concerned with the fact of my conversion, I have wished to do a service to Catholicism—but in no other way.' Only indirectly, therefore, can we say with Ward: 'He had come forth as the champion of the Catholic priesthood.' (*Ibid.* p. 34.)

by the simple faith in the Catholic Creed and system, of which they always gave evidence, and which they never seemed to feel, in any sense at all, to be a burden. And now that I have been in the Church nineteen years, I cannot recollect hearing of a single instance in England of an infidel priest.'

Thence he passes on to extol their services in slum-parishes, and during the cholera: this proves clearly that they are not 'a set of hypocrites.' In all this there is nothing formally opposed to Acton's or Newman's private words; Acton most distinctly admits that the man who lies about Infallibility will be straightforward in other things; and he knew as well as Newman how many there were who would risk life for the faith. To argue from one of these questions to the other is almost as gross as the quibble which Macaulay exposes in the defenders of Charles I.:

'We charge him with having broken his coronation oath; and we are told that he kept his marriage vow! We accuse him of having given up his people to the merciless inflictions of the most hot-headed and hard-hearted of prelates; and the defence is that he took his little son on his knees and kissed him!'

Moreover, when we compare Newman's words in this passage concerning Bishop Ullathorne with those which I have quoted earlier from his letter to Ambrose St. John, and with other equally confidential utterances, we see at once what divergent impressions may be gathered from his public apologetics and from his private confessions. Again, even if I have missed more significant passages in the *Apologia*—passages which really do contradict the Coleridge letter—then we must judge them by the ordinary standards of human conduct. As Dr. R. L. Poole has remarked in discussing the self-contradictions of John the Scot, 'when a man makes use of conventional language and also of expressions entirely opposed to it and strikingly original, we cannot hesitate as to which is the genuine utterance of his own opinion.'[8]

There is no doubt that Acton was provoked by the apparent difference between Newman's public and private utterances concerning Infallibility, and judged him hardly on that account. Writing to Gladstone concerning the death of Newman, 'the greatest of your English contemporaries,' he adds:

'You know that in this instance I am forced to use the ambiguous word *great* as I should in speaking of Napoleon or Bismarck, Hegel

[8] *Medieval Thought and Learning*, 1920, p. 62.

or Renan. But I should quarrel with every friend I have, if I said all I know, or half of what I think, of that splendid Sophist.' [9]

Newman's historical acquirements were not comparable to those of Acton or Döllinger; but he did know enough to render the exact balance between truth and obedience practically impossible; and sometimes he fell. We must read the *Apologia* side by side with the extracts from his contemporaneous journals and letters in Ward, but especially with that letter to Monsell which Acton has handed down to us.[10]

> 'The whole English-speaking Catholic population all over the world is under Propaganda, an arbitrary military power . . . And who is Propaganda? Virtually, one sharp man of business. . . In this age at least, *Quantula sapientia regimur*! Well, if all this could be said of any human institution, I should feel very indignant; but it is the very sense and certainty I have of the Church being divine which at once makes it easy to bear. All this will be over-ruled; it may lead to much temporary mischief, but it will be over-ruled. . . . I should say all this without any reserve to my own Bishop, if he gave me the opportunity, for I think to do so is a duty of loyalty. But I do not expect any Bishop will try to find out what I, or anyone who sees what I do, thinks on the matter; and therefore I leave it to God. Meanwhile . . . the quasi-military power of Propaganda has the jurisdiction and the control of the intellect.'

This was in January, 1863, eighteen months before the Coleridge letter and fifteen before the beginning of the *Apologia*. Four months later, he harps on the same string:

> 'But now, *to go to the root of the matter.*' (Italics mine.) 'This country is under Propaganda. . . . How can I fight with such a chain on my arm? It is like the Persians driven to fight under the lash. . . . There are no schools now [in the Church], no private judgment (in the religious sense of the phrase), no freedom, that is, of opinion. That is, no exercise of the intellect.' [11]

He consoles himself with: 'This age of the Church is peculiar . . . this is a way of things which, in God's own time, will work its own cure, of necessity.' In other words, the spirit of this intimate confession is the spirit, not of the *Apologia*, but of the Coleridge letter.

[9] *Letters;* ed. Figgis and Laurence, p. 59.

[10] *Ibid.* p. 36; *cf.* Ward I, 581-9 and II, 49.

[11] Ward, I, 586 *ff.* Compare *Apologia* ed. 1880, pp. 266 *ff* ('Position of my mind since 1845'), where the plain surface sense of his words is that 'the whole history of the Church'—including, by inference, the time at which he himself is writing, the time most relevant to his controversy with Kingsley—'gives a negative to the accusation' that 'belief in an infallible authority destroys the independence of the mind.' All page 267 is devoted to the implication that 'all through Church history' there has been no system under which the individual Roman Catholic thinker 'knew an authority, which was supreme and final, was watching every word he

When one of the most truth-loving men of the age was compelled thus to choose sometimes between truth and obedience, we need hardly wonder at the lapses of more ordinary folk whenever the command of a superior, or personal ambition, has brought them to the defence of indefensible positions. I will specify here, out of many, only the cases which I specified in *Anglican Essays*, and which Fr. Walker has avoided answering in spite of repeated challenges. The translation of *Alzog's Church History*, made under the patronage of two Archbishops for use in American seminaries, purposes in its preface to be 'scrupulously faithful'; yet, when we come to Alzog's description of the Vatican council, the so-called translation differs so essentially from the original that they might be printed separately as pamphlets written against each other by almost irreconcilable opponents. Again, Father Joseph Rickaby, S.J., published it as 'the common Protestant notion' that, 'whatever belief or opinion a man holds, he is not morally accountable to God or to man for believing or thinking so.' I challenged him in a public letter to give evidence; he produced quotations so absurd that I proposed publishing them to his confusion; he debarred this by claiming that his answer to my public letter had been private; and this false assertion is, of course, protected from direct exposure by the law of copyright. The public would have been obliged simply to choose between my word and his, as to this plain issue of fact, if I had not called in a third person of unexceptionable probity to decide. Again, Dom J. Chapman, one of the best-known English Benedictine scholars, made an equally untenable assertion in dispute with Bishop Gore; challenged either to substantiate or retreat, he excused himself on the ground that the words were written 'some years ago'—as though 'Catholic Truth' were a perishable article which could not be expected to keep reasonably fresh!—and that they occurred in 'a somewhat rhetorical appeal'—as though it were a pious deed for a pastor to disguise falsehoods in rhetoric! Again, Monsignor J. S. Vaughan,

said, and made signs of assent or dissent to each sentence as he uttered it. Then, indeed, he would be fighting, as the Persian soldiers, under the lash, and the freedom of his intellect might truly be said to be beaten out of him.' Yet this is merely what, almost at the same moment, Newman is confidentially confessing as the actual state of things in his own Church!

brother of the late Cardinal, published statistics designed to prove the superiority of Catholic to Protestant morality: these figures were so shamelessly garbled that, on their exposure, a fellow-Catholic wrote to express his shame and indignation. Yet this eminent Papal Chaplain has never withdrawn these statements. Lastly, Cardinal Gasquet has not only published, but deliberately reprinted without alteration six years afterwards, in spite of the most public exposures, mis-statements of which one at least is as indefensible as to deny the spelling of his own name. The Cardinal's writings swarm with inaccuracies which can be palliated only by the blindest partisanship; yet he has publicly boasted that it was his historical writings which earned him the Cardinalate. Even at the time of his greatest vogue, nobody would have seriously compared him as a scholar with his fellow-Catholics Döllinger, Acton, or Duchesne. Yet Döllinger died excommunicate, Duchesne's history was put on the Index, and, though Acton was too formidable for the hierarchy to provoke an actual quarrel, they do their best to forget his most important writings. Anyone, again, who is inclined to argue mathematically from Newman's public apologetics to his uncensored private convictions, should compare carefully the two almost contemporary utterances to which I have referred in note 11.

My indictment (let me end as I began) is against the actual hierarchy of the Roman Catholic Church and the publicists who try to justify hierarchical policy. Newman, in his great ignorance of general medieval history, looked back fondly upon an imaginary era of medieval scholasticism when 'there was true private judgment' and the disputants were allowed 'free and fair play.'[12] If he had actually lived in those medieval days, and had written as he wrote in 1863, he would have run a great risk of the stake. Another illusion, no less pathetic: he looked forward to a day when this quasi-military power of Propaganda would disappear: yet it is notorious that Propaganda is as strong now as ever. And that is the reason why certain men, whom we should not hesitate to believe in other matters, must be checked with the greatest possible suspicion when they make historical assertions in favour of the Roman Catholic Church.

[12] Ward, II, 49.

THE POETRY OF GEORGE MACDONALD
(1824—1905)

By the Rev. A. T. Woodman Dowding, M.A., Vicar of Southwold.

A PUNGENT critic of modern men and manners recently ruffled our Neo-Georgian self-sufficiency by invidiously comparing the heads of contemporary intellectuals with those of the greater Victorians. A debate of some heat ensued. Perhaps such comparisons are odious; but they are useful if they restrain the post-War generation from over-indulgence in sweeping judgments respecting their grandparents. After all, as Bacon said, 'The Present is only a child seated on the shoulders of a giant (the Past).' It is good for lush youth to learn modesty. Judgments of the past are two-edged. The epithet 'Victorian' should be used with discrimination and sympathy, and not as a facile generalisation.

Quite apart from the question of their intellectual superiority, who will seriously deny the spiritual qualities of the greater Victorians? In an age of 'headlines' and 'hustle' their leisurely moralising appears 'unreal' to those who listen more readily to the sophist than to the prophet. The Victorians, however, are now coming back to their own because we cannot do without them. The dust of a volcanic upheaval is subsiding. The air is clearer and the visibility is improving. More impressive vistas of the main ranges of Victorian genius are being made possible. We are finding out that there are more than a few outstanding peaks. It was a high tableland of genius. There among the rest still waiting for general recognition is George Macdonald, whose centenary has just been celebrated. Though his life has been recently published by the poet's son, Dr. Greville Macdonald, it will not be only on that account that this remarkable man will retain a secure niche in our literary Pantheon. His annals are his writings. He was 'called' to be a seer.

Born into a family that could trace its descent back to the Macdonalds who suffered in the Massacre of Glencoe—a fact which will have its significance for persons of Highland descent —George Macdonald's rearing was on the land and his religious training subjected to the prevailing Calvinistic influences of the

time. He graduated at Aberdeen, and in 1850 accepted a pastorate under the Congregational Communion for a few years. The rest of his long life was devoted to letters. His friendships were many and catholic. He was a self-made man and owed little to those adventitious aids which confer greatness upon Fortune's favourites. And yet the term 'self-made' is inadequate: he was first and foremost an 'inspired' man. His public, even in Victorian times, was not a large one. There is a prospect, however, that it may be much larger in the future. His gifted son has produced a biography which must surely extend his father's influence. People of culture are beginning to realise that George Macdonald is worth investigating, although not quite sure whether he will prove worth cultivating.

Something even like a Macdonald cult might come into being, though this would be foreign to his temperament and outlook. Not that he would have minded a few slipping into Fairy-land by his agency. However his poetry is approached no one will have cause to regret the effort. His courage honesty, optimism, when none of these were lip-values (Clough is one of our witnesses) are wedded in their stark simplicity to a tenderness and apostolic mysticism. He made a profound personal impression on many of his contemporaries. The Scotsman is not easily impressed (particularly by another of Caledonia's children), but it was a Scotsman who said of Macdonald after a conversation with him, 'I just thocht it was like Christ himsel' speakin' to me.' There are mystics and mystics. Macdonald in his *Seaboard Parish* says of the mystified mystics of whom the world is weary, 'Mysticism . . . is their name for a kind of spiritual ashpit whither they consign dust and stones never asking whether they may not be gold-dust and rubies all in a heap.' Macdonald's mysticism was that defined by Blake (with whom he has strange affinities) thus: Blake described how he saw the sunrise. It was for him no golden guinea, but an apocalypse of the heavenly energies acclaiming the Highest:

> 'I do not behold the outward creation, and that in me is a hindrance and not action. "What," it will be questioned, "when the sun rises, do you not see a disc of fire, somewhat like a guinea?"
>
> 'Oh, no, no! I see an innumerable company of the heavenly host crying Holy, Holy, Holy is the Lord God Almighty. *I question not my corporeal eye any more than I would question a window concerning a sight. I look through it, and not with it.'*

A course of Macdonald would be a salutary corrective for the highly artificial subjective emotionalism masquerading as Mysticism to-day. The only 'dim *religious* light' in his mystical poetry is that caused by the withdrawal of his Sun when 'the clouds return after the rain.' There is nothing in Macdonald of that exotic self-hypnotism which has been called in of recent years to prop up tottering ecclesiasticism in the ostensible interests of 'the *spiritual* life.' Macdonald in this matter was a disciple of the New Testament. He was a genuine member of that mystical order, the apostolic succession of which has lasted to these times. As such his message will make an appeal to those who cannot away with modern Scepticism and Superstition—those absurd alternatives noisily competing for the suffrages of a Jazz-drugged generation.

Macdonald's first book—a poem, *Within and Without*—was published in 1856, a significant year. It was the year of the Peace of Paris, which terminated the Crimean Campaign with its entail of lowered British prestige that led to the great Indian Mutiny. It was the decade marked by the great trade exhibition (the apotheosis of Free Trade) of which the Crystal Palace stands a pathetic symbol. It was the period immediately after the first full flood of the Oxford Movement. Immobility had succeeded. Ecclesiastical thought (Robertson of Brighton had died three years before) was 'between the tides.' The times were tired, stale, and stodgy, as they continued for many a day, and were the cause of the unpleasant associations that have gathered about the term 'Victorian.' Macdonald voices the need of the period thus:

'O wind of God that blowest in the mind,
Blow, blow and wake the gentle spring in me;
Blow, swifter blow, a strong, warm summer wind,
Till all the flowers with eyes come out to see;
Blow till the fruit hangs red on every tree,
And our high-soaring song-larks meet thy dove—
High the imperfect soars, descends the perfect love!

Blow not the less though winter cometh then;
Blow, wind of God, blow hither changes keen;
Let the spring creep into the ground again,
The flowers close all their eyes and not be seen:
All lives in thee that ever once hath been!
Blow, fill my upper air with icy storms;
Breathe cold, O wind of God, and kill my cankerworms.'

Another portent was close at hand. *The Origin of Species* appeared in 1859, to be the fruitful cause of so many misunderstandings. Then came the Spencerian Armistice in the duel between Idealism and Naturalism. Spencer's was a practical proposal and suited as such a trade-obsessed age. This philosophical Solomon divided the child of thought, leaving the Knowable to Science and the Unknowable to Religion. This operation was carried out without protest by the putative parents and won the general approval of men of common sense. The world dreamed on, comfortably pillowed on this Spencerian compromise, but it was not refreshing sleep. There were unpleasant nightmares in this 'undogmatic slumber.' The 'two-compartment' theory of life led to unpleasing moral anomalies as a result of the partnership of Capital and Christ. Macdonald tried to save his world from this, but most regarded him as a dreamer. Yet, as Browning says,

> 'A poet never dreams:
> We prosefolk do: we miss the proper duct
> For thoughts on things unseen.'

The reason for this is that prose folk invert the order of knowledge by which a man may see life steadily and see it whole. The title of Macdonald's first poem, *Within and Without*—a paradox to commonsense—will put us on the true line of approach, that is, 'the proper duct.'

Enough has been said to call a halt to that facile condemnation of the great Victorians which arises from confounding them with the baser aspects of the age in which they lived and which they 'prophesied against.' To ignore this distinction is to ignore the gulf between John the Baptist and the Pharisees who flocked to his baptism. Macdonald's background was Victorian, but the notes he struck were of permanent human value. He had an acute realisation of the torpid languor falling upon men who had lost the inner grip upon the accepted 'scheme of salvation.' He shared their experience without their inertia and their preoccupation with money-making. We can almost hear Clough, his contemporary, in these lines:

> 'I am as a child new-born, its mother dead,
> Its father far away across the seas.
> Blindly I stretch my arms and seek for him:
> He goeth by me, and I see him not.
> I cry to him: as if I sprinkled ashes,
> My prayers fall back in dust upon my soul.'

Not less clearly can we hear Carlyle in the remedy which Macdonald proposes for theological sickness of soul:

'Hark, hark, a voice amid the quiet intense!
It is thy Duty waiting thee without.
Rise from thy knees in hope, the half of doubt;
A hand doth pull thee—it is Providence;
Open thy door straightway, and get thee hence;
Go forth into the tumult and the shout;
Work, love, with workers, lovers, all about:
Of noise alone is born the inward sense
Of silence: and from action springs alone
The inward knowledge of true love and faith.'

There are more than echoes or anticipations of Clough and Carlyle in Macdonald. There is the magnificent ideal which he set out to follow all the days of his life. It is one that should be tattooed upon the consciousness of every candidate for Holy Orders:

'The times are changed, and gone the day
When the high, heavenly land,
Though unbeheld, quite near them lay,
And men could understand.'

'They are tired of what is old,
We will give it voices new;
For the half hath not been told
Of the Beautiful and True.'

It is something to believe that in a spiritually sluggish age Macdonald is conscious of the serious issues latent in the break-up of the old theology:

'Caught within a net of fear,
All my dreams undreamed and gone.'

Yet there was courage left if a man was cast off his credal raft into the waves of doubt with no 'definite' teaching to cling to. So his prayer is:

'My soul with truth clothe all about,
And I shall question free;
The man that feareth, Lord, to doubt,
In that fear doubteth Thee.'

To falter would be sin. He would know and face the worst with inspired faith:

'Dome up, O heaven, yet higher o'er my head!
Back, back, horizon; widen out my world!
Rush in, O fathomless sea of the Unknown!
For, though He slay me, I will trust in God!'

Elsewhere we can follow the mental strife in which Macdonald was locked with the best of his contemporaries:

'My very birth into the world of men
Shows me the school where He would have me learn;

> ..... shows me the field
> Where I must fight and die victorious,
> Or yield and perish.'

Victorian decisions were definite. They believed that good was the final goal of ill, and throughout the period this conviction runs like a fugue amid temperamental variations. In the case of Macdonald we can see the theological Highlander leaving the low levels of contemporary controversy for the solitudes of Horeb :—

> 'I will take the mountain path,
> Beard the storm within its den;
> Know the worst of this dim wrath
> Harassing the souls of men.'

Reality is all of a piece, and there are to be observed intimations for the reflective eye of an inherent logic in the universe :

> 'We know by the tempest we do not lie
> Dead in the pits of eternity.'

Besides, there is Truth for man to strive for in spite of the Pragmatists who had not then arrived to add one more uncertainty to life :

> 'Truth alone, without, within,
> Can the soul's high homage win!'

Nevertheless the Pragmatists have expressed with precision what has been in the marrow of vital Christianity :

> 'Who *does* the truth, is one
> With the living truth above.'

Yet Macdonald did not forsake the old theology without a pang. He writes :

> 'It may be there is yet a home
> In that religion old.'

But it is only spiritual home-sickness. The old home can be but a memory because

> 'My spirit will not enter here
> To haunt the holy gloom;
> I gaze into a mirror mere,
> A mirror, not a room.'

A philosopher has said that Nature conceals God, and human nature reveals Him. Macdonald would not have assented to the first part of the statement. To him :

> 'Each hue, each harmony divine,
> The holy earth about,
> Its soul will send forth into mine,
> My soul to widen out.
> And thus the great earth I shall hold
> A perfect gift of thine.'

He found healing balm in Nature and human nature alike. In the latter perhaps because he saw men, not as they were, but as they appeared reflected in the light and loveliness of his own white purity of life. His unaffected love of children, which is not at all the same thing as patronising or spoiling them, must have assisted materially his theological reconstruction. This alone is worth the attention of would-be teachers to-day. He is convinced, however, that there are no short-cuts to certitude and the beatific vision. The first step is to wait for the Father:

> 'Go thou into thy closet; shut thy door;
> And pray to Him in secret: He will hear.
> But think not thou, by one wild bound, to clear
> The numberless ascensions, more and more,
> Of starry stairs that must be climbed, before
> Thou comest to the Father's likeness near,
> And bendest down to kiss the feet so dear
> That, step by step, their mounting flights passed o'er.
> There falls a sense of showers and of the spring;
> A hope that makes it possible to fling
> Sickness aside, and go and do the deed;
> *For highest aspiration* will not lead
> Unto the calm beyond all questioning.'

The second step is like unto it, namely, this:

> 'to give thyself away
> For love's own sake, not for thyself, I say';

to those whom God loves in spite of appearances to the contrary. For

> 'Highest *aspiration* will not lead
> Unto the calm beyond all questioning.'

Macdonald's Christology, like Browning's and Tennyson's, lacks the precision of the Schools, but there is Christological teaching in his poems for an age that seems to subsist with the minimum of doctrine. It may be that the theologians are at fault. It may be that the poets are the best theologians. They at all events give us what they *know*. Moreover, it is what we knew all the time and could not express for ourselves. There is not a little that is positive in the following quotation, though the dogmatic theologian might regard it as inadequate:

> 'But when He came in poverty, and low,
> A real man to half-unreal men,
> A man whose human thoughts were all divine,
> The head and upturned face of human-kind—
> The God shone forth from all the lowly earth,
> And men began to read their maker there.
> Now the Divine descends, pervading all.
> Earth is no more a banishment from heaven;

But a lone field among the distant hills,
Well ploughed and sown, whence corn is gathered home.
Now, now we feel the holy mystery
That permeates all being: all is God's;
And my poor life is terribly sublime.
Where'er I look, I am alone in God,
As this round world is wrapped in folding space;
Behind, before, begin and end in Him:
So all beginnings and all ends are hid;
And He is hid in me, and I in Him.
Oh, what a unity, to mean them all!—
. . . . . .

To mean each one, yet fuse each in the all!
O centre of all forms! O concord's home!
O world alive in one condensèd world!
O face of Him, in whose heart lay concealed
The fountain-thought of all this kingdom of heaven!
Lord, thou art infinite, and I am thine!'

BOOK REVIEWS

AN ORIGINAL BOOK ON PRAYER*

Archdeacon Lilley's little book is quite one of the most important books on prayer that have been produced of recent years. It was written independently of Heiler's *Das Gebet* and in a far shorter space than the German Professor, it provides what has hitherto been a great desideratum, namely, a history of the theory and practice of prayer as conceived by the great masters in the Christian tradition. It is written in an easy and graceful style, readily comprehensible by the plain man; but it has behind it an encyclopædic knowledge of patristic, mediaeval and post-reformation Catholic theology interpreted by a mind profoundly sympathetic, and at the same time critical, in its appreciation both of the merits and the limitations of the religious and intellectual tradition which it so vividly portrays.

A key-note is struck at the outset by the emphasis on the startling contrast between Christian and pagan conceptions of prayer.

'We do not pray to Jupiter,' says Cicero, 'to make us good, but to give us material benefits. . . All men acknowledge that every material good and all material prosperity come from the gods, but no one has ever referred to God the acquisition of virtue. For it is on account of our virtue that we are with justice praised, it is in our virtue that we legitimate glory; which should not be the case if virtue were a gift from God, and not an achievement of our own. Therefore we must pray to God for the gifts of fortune, but wisdom we must acquire for ourselves.'

From the very beginning and consistently in all the great Christian teachers, it is pointed out, an absolutely opposite conception of prayer prevailed.

'Human virtue is always and everywhere dependent on, not independent of, Divine assistance. . . The uniform Christian tradition con-

* *Prayer in Christian Theology, A study of some Moments and Masters of the Christian Life from Clement of Alexandria to Fénelon.* By A. L. Lilley, M.A. (S.C.M., 1925. Price 4/-. Pp. x—108.)

demns as of the nature of blasphemy any attempt or desire to bend the Divine will to our own. It conceives of prayer as the costing and difficult uplifting of our wills towards God. It therefore requires as an indispensable antecedent of all acts of prayer an anxious desire to learn with the highest possible degree of certitude what is the will of God. It enjoins the most confident and fervent prayer for all those things which are beyond all doubt or question according to His will. And those for the Christian are just the things for which, according to Cicero, no one would think of praying to God; and as to those things for which alone the Roman prayed the most careful Christian teaching has always insisted upon our necessary ignorance as to whether they are according to the Divine will or not, and has therefore impressed upon us the necessity of praying for them, if at all, with that reservation.'

A further point is emphatically brought out.

'The Christian view has been that mere man cannot pray at all. . . It is God in us who prays. It is our nature penetrated by the Divine Spirit and assisted by the Divine Grace that is alone capable of prayer in the full Christian sense. Prayer on this view is essentially a supernatural act.'

Furthermore the theme is developed that for Christianity prayer is a continuous spiritual state within which, indeed, separate acts find their place . . . but it is not their mere repetition, however frequent, but their separate and varied representation of a continuously inspired state of soul that constitutes them authentic instances of prayer.

It is obvious that the numerous difficulties urged against the practice of prayer from the standpoint of modern scientific conceptions miss the mark as objections to prayer as thus conceived by the great masters in the Christian tradition. The objections are valid against prayer in its pagan conception and in the conception of it implied in a great deal of popular religion and cultus within Christianity. A remarkable point, however, is the complete divorce between this popular conception and the philosophy of prayer expounded by the great masters—whether we study it in the Christian Platonists of Alexandria, in the founders of the earliest monastic system, in the teaching of mediaeval saints, like Bernard and Hugh of St. Victor, or of those post-reformation schools represented by the Spanish mystics of the circle of St. John of the Cross and Saint Theresa, or in the typically French development in which the names of Fénelon and St. Francis de Sales are the most famous representatives.

The book fills a gap in modern theological literature; and it should secure a welcome equally from the expert theologian and the plain man.

B. H. STREETER.

THE BIBLE IN THE MODERN WORLD.

Dr. Fosdick's latest book, *The Modern Use of the Bible*,[1] is perhaps the best of the many good things which have come from his pen. It is not that he writes anything of which the Liberal Churchman is likely to say, 'This is startlingly new.' Novelty is scarcely possible when dealing with so well worn a subject as the intelligent approach to the Bible. And yet the treatment is so cogent, the arrangement of material so admirably clear, the illustrations are so apt and drawn from so wide and varied a field of knowledge, that novelty of effect is perhaps after all the outstanding impression which a study of this volume will produce.

[1] *The Modern Use of the Bible.* By H. E. Fosdick, D.D. (S.C.M., 1924. Pp. 291. Price, 6/-.)

Over and over again Dr. Fosdick puts his finger unerringly upon what he terms 'the nub of the difficulty.' He knows exactly where the problems which beset the path of the modern preacher mainly lie. He is sympathetic alike with those who have been brought up in traditional ways of thinking, and also with the young in their revolt against methods of teaching which honesty forbids them to accept as either legitimate or helpful. And he is able to demonstrate effectively how much has been done by the modern study of the Bible to remove difficulties and to restore confidence.

As an example our author takes the single fact that scholars have been able to arrange the books of the Old Testament in chronological order, and shows how, with this achieved, it becomes possible to trace a clear development from lower to higher either in the field of ethics, or in ideas of prayer, or indeed in any single important conception which the student may elect to study. And in this doctrine of progress he sees a way to freedom. No longer need the preacher apologise for biblical conceptions which fall below the standard of the best thought of his own time, no longer need he make the desperate attempt to harmonise teachings which are in essential contradiction, no longer need he take the line of least resistance and omit from consideration large tracts of material about which he is afraid to speak plainly.

The obvious contrasts between the world as conceived by the biblical writers and the world of to-day, and the consequent difficulty experienced by the modern man in 'shifting his mental gear' every time he enters a church, are presented with convincing honesty and force. Superficially, of course, the two world-views are incompatible, and the very increase in our knowledge of the old world which scholarship in its various branches has rendered possible, has but served to widen further the gulf between old and new. Hence for the most part modern preaching 'has not been teaching people how to think in the realm of religion. It has been practical, human, encouraging, vital, but it has been intellectually loose-jointed and rickety. It has evaded real questions. It has surrendered old intellectual frame-works without getting new ones. It has let the church drift before the breezes of inspirational preaching upon the rocks of intellectual confusion.'

Having dealt in detail with allegory—the ancient and frequently attractive method whereby men have attempted to bridge the gulf between the old and the new (a method, moreover, which may be seen at work in all the great non-Christian faiths at the present day), Dr. Fosdick approaches his central contention that it is needful to distinguish sharply between 'Abiding Experiences' and the 'Changing Categories' in which from time to time they find expression. In illustration of his thesis he cites four examples, the belief in immortality, in a catastrophic ending of the world-order, in demons, and in angels, and his own summary will best convey to the reader the frankness and vigour with which the position is handled. 'When, therefore, a man says, I believe in the immortality of the soul, but not in the resurrection of the flesh, I believe in the victory of God on earth, but not in the physical return of Jesus, I believe in the reality of sin and evil, but not in the visitation of demons, I believe in the nearness and friendship of the divine Spirit, but I do not think of that experience in terms of individual angels, only superficial dogmatism can deny that that man believes the Bible.'

Some may feel that the concluding chapters on 'Jesus, the Messiah,' and 'Jesus, the Son of God,' scarcely reach the level of excellence attained in the rest of the book. Be that as it may, the treatment both of Miracle

and of the perils of Liberalism will be found of the greatest value. In speaking of Miracle, Dr. Fosdick is at once refreshingly frank and essentially constructive. The ground is first cleared by an admirable exposition of the varying meanings which have been attached to the word miracle in the course of its history. There follows a sympathetic statement of the attitude of the modern man, who feels of the stories of miracles that they are historically unreliable, and of miracles themselves that they are at once improbable *a priori*, and practically undesirable. Dr. Fosdick insists further that the conception of natural law is one which brings release and not imprisonment to the human spirit, and that the business of the modern believer is not to argue himself into accepting the record of an alleged miracle as a matter of faith, but rather to endeavour to ascertain what it was which made the story originally credible. 'Faith in the miraculous is not primarily mental credence of past events; it is spiritual adventure into the release and use of divine powers in our own day.'

Progressive thinker as he is, Dr. Fosdick is well aware of the perils of the Liberal position. He is sure that the great human experiences of which the Bible is the store-house are unchanging and of permanent significance. To study these experiences is not enough; we are called to share them. Hence the foremost peril of our day is the peril of the 'botanical mind,' which makes it easy to analyse and difficult to construct. And yet constructive we must be. A man may rightly feel that he cannot honestly use an old formula as the exact expression of his own faith. Yet merely to ignore it will not suffice. He must translate it back into the experience which called it forth. Vagueness, masked as wide-minded tolerance, is the Liberal's besetting sin. But vagueness will not do; the discarding of old formulas, however tempting an occupation, leads nowhere. We must 'create new formulas endowed with the same persuasiveness and penetrating power which the older mental categories once possessed. The great experience of the Bible must be enshrined in positive formulas, even if that means building up a new orthodoxy which in time will be dissolved by a new liberalism.'

The need for books which, while maintaining the permanent value of the Bible, will insist relentlessly on the essential difference between inspiration and infallibility, is illustrated by Dr. Gore's little volume, *The Doctrine of the Infallible Book*,[2] as by an anonymous pamphlet, *What of the Bible?*[3] which we have been asked to notice. Both of these will be found useful; but they lack not only the detail, but what we may perhaps be forgiven for describing as the 'punch' of Dr. Fosdick's volume. True, his Americanisms hit us rather hard—'Resurrected' is an infliction peculiarly galling! Yet we can bring ourselves to accept them as part and parcel of that atmosphere of freshness and vigorous alertness which the book creates.

W. Maurice Pryke.

A CHRISTIAN APOLOGETIC.*

These lectures have not lost anything of their value despite the fact they were delivered nearly twenty years ago. Nevertheless the twin evils against which they were primarily written, irrationalism and superstition, are still with us to-day: hence we welcome their republication.

[2] *The Doctrine of the Infallible Book.* By Charles Gore, D.D., with a Section by Professor H. R. Mackintosh, D.D. (S.C.M., 1924. Price, 1/-.)

[3] *What of the Bible?* By A.R.W. (Skeffington, 1924. Price, 1/6.)

**Personal Idealism and Mysticism.* By W. R. Inge, C.V.O., D.D., F.B.A. (3rd edition. Longman's. 5/- net.)

Showing first that God is incomparably more than a mere ecclesiastical shibboleth, that beauty, truth, and goodness are all aspects of Him who passes human comprehension, the Dean goes on to consider the general character of the Divine self-revelation to mankind. In doing this he gives a delightfully lucid account of the progress of theology during the great formative period of the Christian era. Afterwards he shows the value to the modern world of the Logos Christology as it was then evolved. Having thus made out a good claim for the orthodox doctrine of the Church, Dean Inge proceeds to deal with various modern writers and to reveal and account for the fundamental weakness in their treatment of the problems of the universe. These writers he divides into two classes roughly according as whether they are philosophic pragmatists or religious reactionaries and he discovers their common fallacy to be that they both alike take an anthropocentric view of the universe. Faced by the problem of evil they both take refuge in different kinds of scepticism. The former are led to conceive of the cosmos as pluralistic: the latter, while adhering to the belief that there is only one God, maintain that He reveals Himself in ways which are contrary to our reason. Dean Inge believes that only by taking a cosmocentric view is it possible to reconcile the opposing groups of facts and to avoid these errors. The disparagement of the intellect which is so much in fashion just now is brimful of mischief, and, in pointing this out, the Dean has much to say concerning the place of the intellect in any rational scheme of things, most of which is of enduring value. The last lecture is devoted to a treatment of the problem of sin and evil, which he rightly feels is inadequately done by both the parties he is writing against. He goes back to the fountain-head of Christian ethics, considers the attitude of Our Lord to the problem, and frankly insists on the difference between His treatment and that of His professed disciples in all ages. He placed all the emphasis on the good, the true, and the beautiful: theologians since have ever been tending to ignore that fact and to concentrate attention on the sinfulness of human nature. So it is largely with modern Psychologists: they too are preoccupied with the shortcomings of mankind but with no compensating abhorrence of sin. But, in Bunyan's metaphor, the golden crown of eternal life is not found by grubbing in the muck heap of human frailties: but it is offered to us from above. Nevertheless modern Psychology is beginning to outgrow this phase and has already discovered much and formulated more. Consequently it is with some regret that we notice Dean Inge apparently ignores the work of men like Mr. Thoulness.

J. D. C.

THE WORLD A SMUDGE.

However unsatisfactory the belief that behind the Universe there are two, and not one, first principles may appear to the philosopher, the easy solution which dualistic theories afford to the problems of sin and suffering makes them a continual source of attraction to certain types of religious mind. It is not surprising, therefore, that many religious systems have incorporated a number of dualistic elements. But in few systems has dualism occupied so fundamental a place as in that of the Manichees. For here the dualism is carried to the furthest extremes; and for this reason, if for no other, a study of Manichaeism is of great interest as showing the conclusions to which a religious system, built up on a dualistic basis, ultimately leads. And, though Manichaeism has long ceased as a living reli-

gion, through S. Augustine—who was himself for ten years a member of the sect—it has probably exercised a considerable influence on Western theology. We can hardly doubt that much of the Augustinian theory of sin which is so foreign to our categories of thought is to be traced back to S. Augustine's Manichaean predecessors.

Mani, the founder of the Religion, was probably born in 216 A.D. At an early age he received Divine revelations and the call to preach a new faith; and, on the day which Sippor I. was crowned King of Persia, March 20th, 242, he started public propaganda in support of his views. After visiting Central Asia, China and India, he was executed by Sippor's grandson somewhat more than thirty years later.

An excellent summary of his teaching is given by Professor Burkitt in his recent Donellan Lectures.[1] 'The Manichees began with the Two Roots, and to this was added the Three Moments. The Two Roots, or Principles, are those of the Light and the Dark; by the Three Moments they mean the Past, the Present, and the Future. Light and Darkness are two absolutely different eternal Existences. In the beginning they were separate, as they should be. But in the *Past,* the Dark made an incursion on the Light and some of the Light became mingled with the Dark, as it still is in the *Present*; nevertheless, a means of refining this Light from the Dark was called into being and of protecting the whole realm of Light from any further invasion, so that in the *Future* the Light and the Dark will be happily separated' (*op. cit.* p.17).

That such a view is closely connected with the Gnostic conception of the Universe is evident at once. Professor Burkitt, in fact, maintains that Manichaeism is a form of Christian Grosticism. S. Ephraim Syrus, one of the chief authorities of our knowledge of the religion, says that the Manichees "say about Hermes in Egypt and about Plato among the Greeks, and about Jesus Who appeared in Judaea that 'they are the Heralds of the Good One to the world'" (quoted, *op. cit.* p. 38). This passage, taken in connection with others, shows that Mani believed in a succession of prophets, the last of whom was Jesus. And S. Augustine tells us that he began all his letters with 'Mani, Apostle of Jesus Christ' (quoted, *op. cit.,* p.38). But, if we find the central teaching of Christianity in its belief about the Incarnation, we cannot regard Manichaeism as Christian; if matter is essentially evil, it is not possible that God should have become man. Mani was ready to admit this, and built up a docetic Christology. Indeed, if, as Professor Burkitt maintains, he derived his conception of Jesus mainly from the Marcionite New Testament and the Syriac Diatessaron, he may have been unaware that the facts of history demanded a real Incarnation.

Our knowledge of the Manichees, even now, is not very extensive; our chief authorities are the works of their opponents. These include certain writings of S. Augustine (who was himself for several years a Manichee); of S. Ephraim Syrus (died 373 A.D.); and of a number of Mohammedan writers. Recently, however, a number of fragments of actual Manichean documents have been discovered in Chinese Turkestan, and it is to these that Professor Burkitt pays particular attention in his lectures. These have been published for the most part in German or French; and Professor Burkitt's treatise is valuable in that it contains the first introduction of them to English readers. The fact that they are written either in Middle Persian or Early Turkish unfortunately renders access to them in the original possible only for the expert.

[1] *The Religion of the Manichees.* Donellan Lectures for 1924. By F. C. Burkitt. (Cambridge, 1925. 6/-.)

We should like to have heard more about the relation of the Manichees to the Mandaeans. The only reference which Burkitt makes to the latter sect occurs on p.73, and the evidence which is here adduced from the Mandaean language we venture to call in question. For the majority of recent investigators, following Lidzbarski, have been inclined to believe that the original home of the Mandaeans was not on the banks of the Euphrates, but in West Semitic lands. The interesting theory of Reitzenstein, that the Mandaeans and the Manichees derived their main ideas from a common source (the hypothetical 'Iranian Mystery Religions'), Professor Burkitt does not discuss. We believe, however, that he has little sympathy with it.

In conclusion, we can only recommend the reading of the Lectures themselves. They tend to be rather technical in places; but they are written in Professor Burkitt's attractive style. The Cambridge University Press has produced the work artistically (with three excellent illustrations) at a very moderate price.

F.L.C.

GOD'S TREATMENT OF SIN.

In one of his last letters C. W. Emmet wrote, 'They (the critics of *The Lord of Thought*) are almost unanimously against us; we need to keep hammering at the question, How does God deal with sin?' The two books here noticed together go at least some way towards providing an answer to that question.

Dr. Storr's volume, *The Problem of the Cross*.[1] is valuable for its unusual power of exposition, its frank statement of difficulties, its persistent refusal to rest content with edifying phrases or vague generalities, its unfailing fairness towards points of view with which the writer does not himself agree, its robust insistence on the Cross as presenting not merely an intellectual problem of absorbing interest, but also and primarily, a stern challenge to effort and imitation.

Admittedly the whole subject of the Cross in the New Testament is complicated by a peculiar phraseology essentially foreign to the modern mind, nor must it be forgotten how each classical attempt to formulate a doctrine of the Atonement is of necessity influenced by thoughts of God which reflect in their turn the dominant conceptions of the age to which they belong.

In the case of Jesus we cannot hope to do more than understand a little of what He must have felt about the Cross. Certainly He viewed it as an act of service redemptive in purpose, and effecting a renewal of fellowship between men and God, an act, moreover, which tested loyalty to the uttermost, and was itself inevitable as proving to what lengths God is prepared to go in order to achieve the fulfilment of His loving purposes.

In studying the mind of Paul we need to remember not merely the peculiarity of the Apostle's experience and mental outlook, but in addition the essentially occasional character of the Pauline letters. Paul, it is claimed, saw in the Cross a divine act of universal significance, an example and a challenge, a proof of forgiveness, a transforming principle which made of life an ever deepening fellowship with the mind and spirit of a personal Saviour.

[1] *The Problem of the Cross*. By Vernon F. Storr, M.A., Canon of Westminster. (S.C.M., 1924. Pp. 169. Price, 2/- and 2/6.)

[2] *God's Way with Man*. By Lily Dougall. (S.C.M., 1924. Pp. 124. Price, 4/-.)

For all its value as a record of personal experience, Canon Storr does not hesitate to assure us that 'we are in no way bound to accept St. Paul's interpretation of Christ's death.' Explanations will inevitably differ, and this truth is driven home both by the detailed consideration of certain Pauline passages, and by a study of the Cross as interpreted by the writers of the Epistle to the Hebrews and the Fourth Gospel. 'It is important to remember that from the first there was no one theory of the Atonement.' Hence it is no part of our business to formulate a doctrine of the Cross wherein all theories are welded together into an unreal and artificial synthesis.

The criticism of all doctrines of substitution (a criticism at once trenchant and sympathetic) shows clearly a certain affinity of thought between Canon Storr and Miss Dougall. For example, we cannot rightly speak of God as angry, (1) because the emotion of anger is too human to be postulated of God; (2) because human anger is a quality too obviously tarred with the brush of personal resentment; and (3) because, in point of fact, in the New Testament there is no reference to an angry God. 'The wrath of God' is a phrase expressive rather of an inherent antagonism to evil, and is thus free from undesirable associations. So, too, if the word punishment is rightly to be used of God at all, 'it must be conceived as God's reaction against sin expressed in the laws of the universe and the constitution of man.' And the accusation that by eliminating the thought of divine punishment we shall tend to weaken the sense of the gravity of human sin is vigorously repudiated.

Theories of the Atonement 'Representative' rather than 'Substitutionary' in character are likewise rejected. True, Christ may be thought of as our representative in as far as His life portrays the ideal of what a human life should be and may become, and in the sense too that 'He is possessed of the capacity for forming universal relationships.' But to go further and to claim Him either as 'inclusive man' or as the offerer of 'the sacrifice of perfect penitence' is to talk nonsense, and to repeat the error of those theories which present Christ as doing something in which we in strictness can have no actual share, a something, moreover, by which it is made possible for God to forgive us.

For Canon Storr himself the meaning of the Cross is found primarily in its appeal to the hearts and consciences of men, but it is strongly urged that this appeal must be thought of not as an isolated act, but rather as a continuous process wherein the love of Christ is seen as operative through the activity of the Holy Spirit. Such a view, it is argued, both insists on the cost to God of redemption, and sees in the Cross far more than a 'mere appeal,' since it emphasises the redemptive energy of the living Christ. Here, we are assured, is an interpretation at once essentially loyal to the thought of the New Testament, and able to provide an adequate explanation of the death of Christ as the ultimate proof of the divine love. Because God is Love, and because God is immanent, God must suffer in order to redeem. Such suffering, while it requires a belief in the divine self-limitation, gives no support to a doctrine of divine impotence. God is Love, and can only act in accordance with His own nature. But Love is Power, and the Cross (as Dr. Hodgkin expresses it) is itself an exhibition of the only kind of power God can use.

Apart from the main contents of Miss Dougall's small volume, the two biographical notices which it contains, one of Cyril Emmet, written by Miss Dougall, and the other of Miss Dougall herself, from the pen of

Canon Streeter, make the possession of the book almost a necessity to those who were personally acquainted with the joint authors of *The Lord of Thought*.

Of Miss Dougall's five essays two have already appeared in the *Hibbert Journal*, and the others have been put together from papers which she left in a form more or less complete. The Essay on Providence and Miracle is a fearless attempt to understand and to state the actual methods of divine working. After enumerating what appear to her to be unsatisfactory solutions of the problem, Miss Dougall sums up her own position thus :— 'If God so loved the world as to give it part of His own freedom, seeking from it some better thing than could be got by compulsion, if He seeks to win and foster the highest by foregoing the right to interfere or compel, He may still be believed to be the loving all-Father revealed in Jesus Christ.'

While appreciating the value of the idea of Miracle in as far as it serves to safeguard the truth that God may best be conceived as Person rather than as Principle, Miss Dougall has little patience with an irruptionist theology as formulated by such admittedly able writers as Dr. Temple and Canon Quick. Had she lived to read the former's *Christus Veritas* she would have found in its pages the same 'attribution of irruptive action to God,' the same 'splendid ambiguity' in the use of the term intervention, the same failure to face honestly the problem of 'divine non-intervention,' the same unwillingness 'to believe that God sends us our daily bread through bakers if He did not sometimes send it by a raven,' of which she here complains.

When dealing with the nature of divine forgiveness, Miss Dougall follows Emmet in refusing point-blank to accept certain passages in the teaching of Jesus as authentic. Facing boldly the need for discrimination between primary and secondary strata, she at any rate would not have echoed the recent demand of Father Woodlock that Christians shall accept only 'the Christ of the uncensored Gospels.' In her essay on 'The Worship of Wrath' she pleads convincingly against the popular belief that 'God hurts people of set purpose.' Like Canon Storr, she refuses to attribute anger to God, pointing out relevantly enough what psychology has to say of anger as an emotion compounded of two elements, 'a beautiful and true antipathy to wrongdoing, and a primitive and misdirected enthusiasm for punishment as its antidote.' Certainly psychology is teaching us that our motives are never quite as noble as we like to believe, and Miss Dougall's protest against the age-long habit of attributing to God 'our clumsy best in ideal and practice without any suspicion that our best is a compound of good and evil' certainly merits careful consideration.

She is right too in pointing out that legal justice is concerned only with behaviour and its results, while God, as she might have expressed it in the words of an old Scotch preacher, 'respects adverbs more than verbs.' Nor can we refuse to accept the fact upon which Miss Dougall finally insists, that while the very ruthlessness of Nature, as in the case of the Japanese earthquake, makes for co-operation and brotherhood, the much trumpeted attempts of the Allies to achieve retributive justice have but served to plunge Europe into greater and more deep-seated animosities.

The challenging suggestiveness of much in this fragmentary volume can only add to our regret that its author did not live to bring to full completion the larger work which she had definitely in view.

W. M. Pryke.

THE HUMAN PARSON.*

'En amante alio accenditur alius.' These words of Augustine might well be the superscription of Mr. Sheppard's book. To him the essential qualification and primary object of a parson is a genuine love of his fellow-men and a desire to know them. Of the spirit of this love and the manner of it Mr. Sheppard has much to say: it is the central theme of his book. He brings to this theme eloquence, experience, and insight. And while we protest that this capacity for friendship is not equally bestowed on all of us, we are rightly reminded that we can get from Jesus something of His genius for it. Mr. Sheppard shares with Dr. Glover, whom he often quotes, the conviction that the only thing which really matters is that the Church, its parsons and its laity, should capture afresh the spirit of Christ. As a peculiarly persuasive appeal for this, Mr. Sheppard's book is worth the study of all. But it is written primarily for ordinands, and is the substance of lectures given to ordinands at Cambridge. Besides his religious appeal, Mr. Sheppard has much to say to ordinands which is at once practical and intimate. He writes of habits of prayer and study, of correspondence, visiting, clergy's wives, and of other subjects. We particularly welcome his warning that theological words, however meaningful and central in the minds of students, are usually unintelligible to congregations. It is the greatest difficulty confronting the preacher that such words as 'Incarnation,' 'Mediation,' 'Holy Ghost,' 'Grace' are not living words to those in the pews, but have rather the effect of producing drowsiness.

To all ordinands who manage to escape for a few moments from the intellectual problems of belief and the requirements of examiners, in order to think about the religious spirit which they hope to bring to their work, about the habits they wish to form and about the things they hope to achieve, Mr. Sheppard's book is invaluable in its positive advice, its warnings, and its stimulating power. And if in consequence the curate's vicar finds him a little lacking in satisfation with the customary and in respect for the soothing inertia of the middle-aged congregation, perhaps it is not a matter for regret. At the same time, it can be doubted if many ordinands will find themselves financially or intellectually equal to the 'reformed magazine,' even if all ordinands suffer acute pain from the artistic and literary efforts of the present insets. Why should not Mr. Sheppard or someone give us more worthy insets?

Mr. Sheppard is a prophet. In the tradition of such he has not great admiration for the authorities and darts at them a few epigrams, not without point. Mr. Sheppard is of the older generation of the 'younger men.' And it would be regrettable if ordinands should start their careers with an attitude to the powers that be which hopes very little of them. Those of us who are young cannot do less than hope that the days of the prophetic modernism of the wilderness are ending and that modernism will receive its rightful place in the councils of the Church. If, however, the authorities meet the younger modernists, not with encouragement, but with distrust, then we shall be right to imitate the strong and patient voices of our predecessors. It is time enough to cry in the wilderness when you are not allowed to speak in the palace.

There has got to come a new conception of a parson's work and of parochial life, and Mr. Sheppard has made what is necessarily only a beginning. He has portrayed to us 'The Human Parson' as the incarnation of many divine qualities. Will he write for us a sequel, 'The Human Parish,' even if it proves, like Plato's state, to be laid up in heaven? *'Thy kingdom come.'* H.G.M.

**The Human Parson,* pp. 96. Rev. H. R. L. Sheppard. (Murray. 2/6.)

CHRISTIANITY AND THE INTERNATIONAL MIND.

Not long ago Dr. W. E. Orchard gave it as his opinion that in the self-sacrificing work carried on by missionaries of all Churches we may see 'the one indisputably Christian flag flying at the present time.' While some will find a note of exaggeration in such a statement, it yet contains sufficient truth to form a challenge to the insularity and negative dullness of much contemporary religion. Nor can we fail to be grateful to the Student Christian Movement for stressing insistently alike the heroic labours of the great pioneer missionaries of the past, and the unparalleled urgency of the missionary obligation in our own day.

The missionary biographies of our childhood were apt to be long, cumbersome, and not seldom ill-arranged and over-loaded with a weight of irrelevant detail, so that the essential greatness and originality of a man's life were frequently obscured, and only the most enthusiastic readers ploughed their way to the end of the story. With the assistance of the Student Movement the United Council for Missionary Education has done valuable service in publishing a series of missionary biographies intended to stimulate interest in and appreciation of the great names of earlier days. As an editorial note at the begining of each volume informs us: 'The series makes no pretence of adding new facts to those already known. The aim is rather to give to the world of to-day a fresh interpretation and a richer understanding of the life and work of great missionaries'—an aim, it should be added, which has achieved notable success in the hands of a group of exceptionally able writers, with the result that the portraits of men such as Henry Martyn, Alexander Duff, François Coillard, and Robert Morrison stand out against the background of their own age and achievements with a new clearness and an unweakened challenge to the Christianity of our own day.[1]

When studying these biographies the reader is faced by a problem of no little complexity. Here are men of untiring energy, great mental ability and the most childlike faith giving their lives in a spirit of prodigal generosity for the cause of Christ. But, however one in essentials may be the faith of a Martyn or a Morrison with the faith of a twentieth century Christian, it must still be admitted that there are of necessity wide differences of emphasis and of outlook. And the question obtrudes itself *nolens volens*, to what extent do the endurance and self-sacrifice of the pioneers find their source and incentive in convictions about the inerrancy of Scripture or the assumed certainty of everlasting punishment for the unbaptised, beliefs which inevitably have lost their hold upon the majority of educated Christians in our own day? Is it indeed the case that teaching kindlier and less dogmatically assured has cut the nerve of missionary endeavour, or can the Liberal Churchman, whatever his views as to the authenticity of the last command of Christ in *Matthew* xxviii, however 'progressive' his attitude towards current problems of New Testament interpretation, still find in the essentially 'world appropriating temper' of Christianity an impetus strong enough to command his whole-hearted enthusiasm for the achievement of a Christian world?

Of one fact experience can leave us in no doubt whatever. The appeal of the New Testament portrait of Jesus Christ, when presented for the first time to men wholly unfamiliar with Christian teaching, may prove as irre-

[1] *Henry Martyn*, by C. E. Padwick, 1922. *Alexander Duff*, by William Paton, 1923. *François Coillard*, by Edward Shillito, 1923. *Robert Morrison*, by Marshall Bromhall, 1924. (S.C.M. 5/- each.)

sistible in revolutionary effect in the present day as in earlier centuries. Every reader of *A Gentleman in Prison*[2] (without doubt one of the most astonishing autobiographies ever written) ,wherein is told the story of the conversion to Christianity of a Japanese convict while under sentence of death for murder in a Tokyo prison, will be struck, more forcibly perhaps than ever before, by the power of words spoken by the historical Jesus to win a response no less eager than that elicited by those same words when first uttered more than nineteen centuries ago.

What we have called, adopting a phrase of Harnack's, the essentially world-appropriating temper of Christianity, is well illustrated by a little volume from the pen of Mr. Hugh Martin,[3] written in order to trace the steady growth of the international mind from its beginnings in the prophetic consciousness of an Amos or an Isaiah, up through the more daring conceptions of the writer of the Servant Passages and the Book of Jonah, to its splendid culmination in the revolutionary statesmanship of the Apostle Paul, by whose vision of a world unified in Christ the implications of teaching discoverable in the oldest strata of the Gospels are carried to their triumphant issue.

Another volume,[4] covering in part the same ground, but carrying the story of the development of the international mind under the impetus of 'the spirit that is called Christ' up to its modern expression in the too lightly appreciated achievements of the League of Nations may serve as an answer to our earlier inquiry whether in point of fact the nerve of missionary activity has now been cut. While the answer must be an emphatic negative, it will yet remain true that the modern missionary has a clearer grasp of the essential purpose and true scope of missionary endeavour than was possesed by the pioneers in the same work. His outlook is far less individualistic, far more statesmanlike and comprehensive. His aims are wider, and he is no longer content to snatch individual souls from the fires of hell. Not, of course, that the supreme importance of the individual personality can ever be neglected, but there has dawned also the grander conception of a great world-commonwealth of Christian nations, to the welfare of which each separate race and people must make its peculiar contribution of effective service. Hence missionaries to-day are alive to the educational importance of their work, wherein the endeavour to Christianise the individual is necessarily linked with the wider project of helping to build up a social and economic order which shall express the principles and spirit of Jesus Christ as unmistakably on a great scale as in the necessarily restricted sphere of the individual life.

Mr. Frank Lenwood's recently published book, *Forces of the Spirit*,[5] makes a useful contribution to the understanding of this wider obligation by calling attention to the economic, social and international implications of the Christian creed. Mr. Lenwood's wide knowledge of social and industrial conditions in Africa, India, Japan, and China renders his picture of the struggles of those countries for decency and freedom of absorbing interest, and strengthens the conviction that never before has the work of the missionary been alike of such compelling urgency and such many-sided fruitfulness as at the present day.

W. M. PRYKE.

[2] *A Gentleman in Prison.* Translated by Caroline Macdonald. (S.C.M., 1923. Price, 4/6.)

[3] *The Kingdom without Frontiers.* By Hugh Martin. (S.C.M., 1924. Price 3/- and 2/-.)

[4] *The Gospel and International Relations.* By J. W. Coutts. (S.C.M., 1923. Price, 4/- and 2/6.)

[5] *Forces of the Spirit.* By Frank Lenwood. (S.C.M., 1925. Price, 2/6.)

CORRESPONDENCE

THE BODILY RESURRECTION OF JESUS CHRIST.

To the Editor of the MODERN CHURCHMAN.

SIR,

May I offer a few comments on Mr. Todd's article in your December issue and his explanatory letter in reply to Mr. Westropp? The central point of his argument is that St. Paul's view of our Lord's Resurrection is utterly different from that of the Gospels and that what St. Paul believed was not 'the resurrection of a corpse, but a vision of Christ.'

This appears to mean that St. Paul's belief in the Resurrection was based on the vision that he saw on the road to Damascus and on the appearance of our Lord to Cephas and the others.

But Mr. Todd only makes this view appear plausible because he begins to quote in the middle of a continuous passage. If the passage be taken as a whole, it clearly asserts that the Resurrection was an event which took place 'on the third day' and treats it as quite distinct from the appearances. Might I ask Mr. Todd one or two questions?

(1) If St. Paul did not believe in the Resurrection of our Lord's physical body, why does he include in his little summary of the faith in *I. Cor.* xv, the statement that 'He was buried'? It would seem to be utterly irrelevant to the subject if Mr. Todd's interpretation be right.

(2) What does St. Paul mean by asserting our Lord rose '*on the third day*'?

(3) In view of St. Paul's assertion that his teaching on the subject is that of the whole Church, is it not strange that two of his own circle, Mark and Luke, should (even a generation later) put forward an altogether different view, without any indication that their teaching is new; and that no early Christian writer ever discovered or referred to this discrepancy?

(4) Mr. Todd suggests that the story of a bodily Resurrection grew up because it was 'easier to grasp'; will he tell us how he would support this in view of the fact that large numbers of persons at all times (including, one would imagine, himself) have found no difficulty in believing in the continuity of spiritual existence after death and yet found the Resurrection of the body a stumbling-block?

(5) If the stories of a bodily Resurrection were not current when St. Paul wrote, why does he spend time in answering objections (*I. Cor.* xv, 35 ff.) which could only have arisen from such beliefs?

(6) Can Mr. Todd tell us of any other writer than St. Paul who uses ἀνάστασις of a non-bodily resurrection?

(7) In order to 'prove' that there is a contradiction between the Pauline and the Gospel stories, a contradiction which was quite unnoticed for centuries and which the large majority of Christian thinkers are still unable to see, Mr. Todd is obliged (*a*) to assert that the Gospel narratives of the Resurrection are unreliable in the *main* point which they record, (*b*) that St. Mark 'colours' and so misrepresents the teaching of our Lord, (*c*) that St. Luke misrepresents his friend and master St. Paul, as well as St. Peter, (*d*) that St. Paul spends time in answering objections to a belief which had not then been held, (*e*) that St. Paul, clear thinker though he is, used ἀνάστασις in an unnatural sense.

Does he really think some of us uncritical if we are unable to accept a hypothesis which involves such amazing consequences?

PERCY HARTILL,
Vice-Principal.

THEOLOGICAL COLLEGE, LICHFIELD.

To the Editor of the MODERN CHURCHMAN.

SIR,

Mr. Hartill is quite right in saying that the central point of my argument is that St. Paul's view of our Lord's Resurrection is utterly different from that of the Gospels. As he asks several questions I propose to answer them one by one.

(1) St. Paul adds the statement that 'He was buried' in order to emphasise the death of Christ, and this is not at all irrelevant to his subject.

(2) By asserting that our Lord rose 'on the third day' St. Paul means that the first vision of Christ which convinced His followers that He had survived death was seen on the third day after His crucifixion and burial.

(3) There is nothing strange in the fact that Mark and Luke should put forward a view of the manner of the Resurrection different from that of St. Paul without indicating that their teaching was new. If they had to face new attacks on the Resurrection is it strange that they should adapt their apologetics to meet the new situation? It is generally agreed that St. John had to face a different situation from St. Mark and that he adapted his gospel to meet the new situation. For example, where St. Mark says that Simon of Cyrene bore the cross of Jesus, St. John says that He bore the cross Himself, 'Βαστάζων ἑαυτῷ τὸν σταυρόν,' (*St. John* xix, 17). We know why St. John put forward this view different from St. Mark's. It was to counteract a Docetic heresy which declared that Jesus was not crucified but that Simon of Cyrene was crucified in His stead. The point is that if St. John could modify St. Mark's story when need arose, without indicating that his teaching was new, is it strange to find St. Luke modifying St. Paul if need arose, without indicating that his teaching was new? No one will think it strange that one Biblical writer modifies—or, if you like, contradicts—another, unless one believes in verbal inspiration.

Mr. Hartill says that no early Christian writer has ever discovered or referred to the fact that Mark and Luke have a different view of the Resurrection from that of St. Paul. I would suggest that Mr. Hartill has overlooked several passages in the Fathers which imply that they were well aware of this discrepancy, but their chief concern was not to draw the logical conclusions from the discrepancies, but to harmonize them. Space forbids more than two examples. Chrysostom says (*Hom.* lxxxvii on St. John), 'It is worth inquiring how an incorruptible Body showed the prints of the nails and was tangible by a mortal hand.' He then proceeds to try to harmonize the idea of an incorruptible Body which he has got from St. Paul, with the idea of a Body which can be touched by hand, which he has got from the Gospel story. He was clearly aware of the discrepancy between the two ideas of our Lord's risen Body. St. Augustine, too, is aware of the discrepancy and takes pains to try to remove it. In his *Retractationes* i, 17, when arguing for the resurrection of the flesh, he is faced by St. Paul's words: 'flesh and blood cannot inherit the Kingdom of Heaven.' To get over this difficulty, he quotes the words of St. Luke, 'Handle Me and see, for a spirit hath not flesh and bones as ye see Me have,' and goes on: 'Whence it is plain that the Apostle did not deny that there will be substance of flesh in the Kingdom of Heaven.' I think Augustine was quite wrong in this conclusion, wrong, too, in interpreting St. Paul by St. Luke, the earlier by the later, instead of *vice versa,* but I give the quotation to show that Augustine found it necessary to meet the

objection of those who found a discrepancy between St. Paul's view of the risen Body and St. Luke's view. Mr. Hartill will easily find more examples for himself.

(4) Mr. Hartill suggests that the idea of a 'bodily' resurrection is not easier to grasp than the idea of a 'spiritual' resurrection, inasmuch as people have found no difficulty in believing in the continuity of spiritual existence after death, but have found the resurrection of the body a stumbling-block. This is certainly true of educated people of our own day, but it does not apply to the Jews of our Lord's day nor to those early Christians who imbibed materialistic ideas from the Jews. Even a scholar like Jerome found it impossible to belief in a resurrection that was not a bodily resurrection. He writes (*Epistle* lxxxiv, § 5) 'The Catholic doctrine of the resurrection becomes absolutely unintelligible without blood and bones and members. Grant these, and Mary is Mary and John is John. Otherwise identity has perished.'

The story of our Lord's Resurrection arose in an environment which believed in a *bodily* resurrection. I suggest that this belief, together with anti-Docetic tendencies, influenced the original story of the Resurrection and led to the growth of legends about a bodily resurrection of our Lord, and that this accounts for such legendary details as *Luke* xxiv, 39, 'Handle Me and see, for a spirit hath not flesh and bones,' and John xx, 27, 'Reach hither thy hand and put in into My side,' and St. Luke's statement that our Lord, after the Resurrection, ate a piece of fish (xxiv, 42). Bishop Westcott tells us that 'the popular conceptions of a carnal Resurrection very speedily overpowered the teaching of the New Testament in the early Church' (*Gospel of the Resurrection*, p. 237). Westcott might have gone further, and with greater truth have said that the popular conceptions of a carnal resurrection had speedily overpowered the teaching of St. Paul even in the New Testament.

(5) I *Corinthians* xv, St. Paul is not meeting objections to our Lord's Resurrection; he is dealing with difficulties about the nature of our own resurrection. He says that our resurrection will be like Christ's, and that we shall have 'spiritual bodies.' Surely the conclusion from this is that St. Paul believed that Christ's risen Body was a 'Spiritual' Body. St. Paul teaches that our resurrection body will be like Christ's. Therefore, if we believe that our bodies will moulder in the grave and our spirits survive the dissolution of our bodies, so also we believe that our Lord's Body mouldered in the grave and His Spirit survived its dissolution. Otherwise St. Paul's analogy between our resurrection and Christ's Resurrection breaks down.

(6) Mr. Hartill asks if I can mention any other writer than St. Paul who uses ἀνάστασις of a non-bodily resurrection. Certainly I can. If he will look as Ignatius' *Epistle to the Smyrnaeans*, xxi, he will find ἀνάστασις used in one and the same sentence of a bodily and of a spiritual resurrection. 'In the name of Jesus Christ and in His flesh and blood, in His passion and resurrection,' which was both carnal and spiritual,' ἀναστάσει σαρκινῇ τε καὶ πνευματικῇ.

(7) (*a*) I do not assert that the Gospel narratives of the Resurrection are unreliable in their *main* point. Surely the main point they record is that our Lord survived death and here I think they are absolutely right in that *fact*. But the subordinate point they record about His Resurrection is the *manner* of it, *i.e.*, that He manifested himself in bodily form so that He was, for example, able to be handled. In this subordinate point I think the Gospel story is wrong and at variance with St. Paul's idea of the Resurrection.

(*b*) and (*c*) That Mark should colour our Lord's teaching or Luke misrepresent St. Paul can cause no surprise to anyone who is not a verbal inspirationist. What was our Lord's teaching about Divorce? Either Mark or Matthew misrepresented Him here, and if here, why not elsewhere? St. Mark and St. Luke were human and not exempt in any way from the limitations and possibilities of error of their day any more than, say, Tacitus or Suetonius were exempt.

Mr. Hartill's statements (*d*) and (*e*) have already been dealt with above and shown to be erroneous.

No point which Mr. Hartill has raised militates against the contention of the original article, *viz.* : (1) To St. Paul, the Resurrection meant a vision of Christ which convinced him that the Lord had survived death. (2) The Gospel stories of our Lord's bodily Resurrection are legendary, being due partly to the influence of anti-Docetism, and partly to the fact that the Jews of our Lord's day believed in a bodily resurrection.

JOHN TODD.

WATEREATON RECTORY,
OXFORD.

THE CHURCH ASSEMBLY.

To the Editor of the MODERN CHURCHMAN.

SIR,

Although one of the least of the Country Clergy, may I be allowed to draw attention to a grievance which is perhaps shared by other of my humble brethren. I speak of the gradual establishment, by the National Assembly of the Church, of a working principle that Might is Right. The first example of resultant injustice to the Clergy of which I complain is in the Dilapidations Measure recently made law. When I accepted this Benefice in 1912, I did so with a knowledge of the existing law and its requirements, and there was an implied contract between myself and Authority which I for my part have endeavoured and will endeavour to carry out. The position now is that Authority, without consulting me, has altered the conditions of that contract to my disadvantage. My lawyer tells me that this is very wrong, but that there is no redress when wrongs are established by Act of Parliament.

A similar process is in course of development with regard to Clergy Pensions, and I imagine that a further injustice will be established by Act of Parliament in the course of the present year and so made Right.

But a more serious wrong looms in the future. The Prayer Book is being revised and supplemented in such a way as must give rise to grave misgivings in the minds of those of us who were ordained clergy of the Church of England and not as Pseudo-Priests of a prodigal daughter of the Church of Rome. The Romanising Party is at present anxious not to arouse suspicion and this year we have Authority only talking of Alternative and Supplementary services. But if that Authority sees no wrong in revising, without our concurrence, our contracts with regard to Dilapidations and Pensions, what guaranatee have we that before many years are passed, that same Authority will be enforcing us, by Act of Parliament, to give up the Book of Common Prayer which we have contracted and sworn to use, and none other, and to substitute for it a Book redolent of Roman superstition and false doctrine?

I am not suggesting for a moment that Dilapidations, Pensions, and Prayer Book Revision are subjects which do not require the full attention of the Church. They do. But the least I ask for myself and for my

brethren who think with me is that new laws shall always contain a clause giving exemption to those unwilling to be a party to their new conditions. It follows that if legislation is just and beneficial there will be little contracting out. If on the other hand injustice is proposed the clergy have a remedy to which they are entitled.

Is it too much to expect that the National Assembly of the Church shall put Right before the Might of a majority vote.

R. H. McCALL,
Rector of Thorne Coffin.

THORNE RECTORY,
YEOVIL.
February 24th, 1925.

ETERNAL LIFE.

SIR,

Under the title 'Village Modernism' your reviewer H.G.M., criticising Rev. A. F. Webling's *New Light on Old Paths*, makes the following remark regarding the author's opinion that psychic research has made a strong case for the continuance of existence—not to be confused with eternal life beyond the grave: 'The emphasis in religious teaching should always lie on eternal life and not on continued existence. *To emphasize the latter brings out a vista of endless possibilities of future reform*, and this inevitably blurs the sharp urgency of the moral issue.'

Surely the statement I have italicized is an amazing one to find in the *Modern Churchman?* It implicitly condones the teaching of Eternal Damnation on the grounds of expediency.

The soul that sinneth it shall die. To be carnally minded is death: surely here is clear proof that Life Eternal is not for all but is conditional?

If we take old age as analogous to Eternal Life and death at birth through physical disabilities (unfitness for life), as analogous to death from sin, we have parallels in human experience, to death from sin conditional survival (dependent upon progress), and Eternal Life, in the Spiritual Realms.

Progress and reform are correlative: is it the Modernist teaching that Life Hereafter is devoid of progress? If to be carnally minded is Death who dare presume to think he is fit at his death for *Eternal* Life?

ERNEST S. THOMAS.

OXFORD.
February 19th, 1925.

(1) It was not the intention of your reviewer to condone the teaching of eternal damnation on the ground of expediency, and it is denied that the passage quoted by your correspondent logically implies it. The question of conditional or unconditional immortality is not raised.

(2) The analogy used by your correspondent suggests that the term 'eternal life' has been misunderstood. As is customary to-day it is not used primarily in the sense of life that goes on for ever in time but in the sense of life that is timeless. Professor de Burgh's paper to the recent Conference on 'The Time-Process, Eternity and God' elucidates the point.

(3) If your correspondent said what progress is, then it might be possible to speculate as to its relation to Life Hereafter.

H. G. M.